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Research Question 
 
 Firstly, I wish to explore the idea of ‘privacy’ from a philosophical, 
practical and legal perspective through highlighting the concept’s historically 
problematic relationship with laws and methods of state surveillance. Of key 
importance is showing how developing technologies and, in particular, the invention 
of the Internet has brought this controversial dichotomy to the forefront of legal, 
political and ethical discourse in 21st-century western society.  
 I will continue by taking a critical eye to the UK’s most recent 
addition to its surveillance corpus; the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA 2016). 
The critique will be conducted in conjunction with the prevailing legal stances of the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) towards similar forms of surveillance 
legislation, proposed or enacted by others parties to the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) in line with Article 8 ECHR; the right to privacy. My critique 
will also draw upon relevant commentary from the discourse outlined above.  
 These investigations will contribute towards providing a tentative 
answer to the question of whether the IPA 2016 can be considered ‘legal’ under 
Article 8 ECHR, in accordance with ECtHR jurisprudence. Notwithstanding, I also 
wish to provide a response to the question of whether the ECtHR’s position on 
Internet surveillance legislation, under Article 8 ECHR, can be considered ‘right’ or 
‘correct’. I will draw upon my previous findings on the nature of ‘privacy’ and also 
analyze the methods of reasoning employed by the court in order to inform my 
conclusion. Instead of trying to find a strict answer, as to whether they are indeed 
‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in their stance (this is highly subjective), my idea with this 
question is simply to illuminate the fact that the ECtHR is, perhaps, not the best-
equipped institution to deal with the highly complicated legal issues that come with 
such rapidly developing technology. I will determine whether there is any truth to 
this during the course of my thesis.  
 
Thesis structure  
 
 Chapter 1 introduces some key concepts which will serve as the 
conceptual underpinning the thesis. It will also provide a brief history of 
surveillance, the purpose of which is to show how progressing technology can alter 
what is deemed as an acceptable practice. Chapter 2 will introduce the Investigatory 
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Powers Act 2016 (IPA) and detail its salient provisions. It will close with a 
commentary on the nature of its provisions with reference to previous discussions. 
Chapter 3 is about Article 8 ECHR and the court’s assessment of surveillance cases 
that have been brought under the aforementioned Article. Through extrapolation, I 
will assess the legality of the IPA 2016 and then provide commentary on whether 
the ECtHR works within the parameters I have strived to highlight. Chapter 4 will 
be the conclusion; it will round-up the thesis in its entirety, form tentative 
conclusions and end with some final remarks.  
 
Research Methodology and Materials 
 
‘Privacy’ is a highly amorphous concept; highly debated, frequently 
misunderstood and constantly evolving against an ever-changing political, 
sociological and technological environment. In order to critically assess 
contemporary laws that serve to protect or potentially infringe ‘privacy’, it is 
imperative to flesh out the meaning of the term as much as is reasonably practicable.  
This is achievable by presenting the historical arguments that have 
persistently accompanied debates on whether the protection of privacy in the law 
should be strengthened in response to arguably intrusive state policies and 
application of new technologies. It is my desire that the sociological and 
philosophical ideas that underpin alternate viewpoints will organically emerge in the 
course of this exploration. I will utilize academic material to this effect.  
Once the historical context has been established, this will serve as a 
useful springboard from which to explore the philosophical/social concepts of 
privacy in more depth. At this point we have a grasp of how privacy has been 
understood, but what are the opinions on how privacy should be understood? To 
provide some insight, I will observe the works of numerous philosophers.  
From here, I will also have the opportunity to look at how current 
world events and mankind’s foray into the digital and internet era have also been 
instrumental in the evolution of the privacy debate. I am keen to emphasize how 
modern day technology has served to add dimensions to the privacy debate that have 
never been previously encountered. An in-depth look at the technology itself will be 
necessary, utilizing material from a variety of sources. 
A summary and analysis of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 will 
follow. A highly controversial piece of legislation, the initial parts of the Chapter 
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will be devoted towards highlighting the conflicting opinions and ideas that 
punctuated and influenced the drafting process. Through this, one will be able to 
frame the numerous political and moral stances on modern-day surveillance law and 
policy against the historical backdrop and arguments that I detailed in the 
Introduction chapter. I am keen to show how, despite the passage of time, the 
arguments remain – in their essence – the same. At this point, we also move to the 
central point of interest of the thesis and that is; whether the development that we 
have seen in surveillance technology been met with public, political and legal 
responses that account for the increased levels of intrusiveness? The thesis will seek 
to provide some insight into how nuanced these understandings and responses are. 
By using the text of the Act and numerous supplementary documents 
(Explanatory Notes, Draft Codes, material from Government agency websites) there 
will be a summary of the numerous surveillance powers. There will also be a 
tentative discussion as to whether there is a tacit acknowledgment – whether through 
the words of the Act or the supplements – that some powers should be deemed as 
more intrusive than others. To finish this Chapter, there will be a general 
commentary on the Act, the bulk of which will be a discussion on how the 
permissions, judicial oversights and safeguards for each particular power differ, and 
whether this can provide further clarification on whether levels of intrusiveness were 
duly considered – producing a nuanced response in the legislation – from the 
drafters.  
An in-depth look at Article 8 (‘Right to Privacy’) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights will follow. To start with, I wish to lay down how 
ECtHR jurisprudence has successfully included internet surveillance powers within 
the remit of Article 8 through the concomitant concepts of the ‘Right to Data 
Protection’ etc. The second half of the Chapter will include a close look at cases 
where State surveillance laws and systems have been brought before the ECtHR 
under Article 8. Parallels will be drawn between the material facts of these cases, the 
response from the Court and the powers and limitations inherent to the Investigatory 
Powers Acts 2016. The goal is to shed some light on the question of whether the Act 
would be considered illegal under Article 8, in line with ECtHR jurisprudence. 
Moreover, I wish to continue this look at intrusiveness (do they consider it?) and 
gauge whether the Court’s approach is sufficiently nuanced and well-equipped to 
properly assess whether a modern day internet surveillance laws do or do not breach 
Article 8.  
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 (a) Key concepts: Safety and security vs. freedom and 
democracy 
 
Big Brother is watching you. 
George Orwell, ‘Nineteen Eighty-Four’ (1949)  
 
The danger that mass surveillance poses to concepts of ‘freedom’ and 
‘democracy’ have long been a topic of fiction as well as of hard academic study. 
George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four is a work that some might disregard as mere 
post-apocalyptic whimsy but its arguably accurate recreation and prediction of the 
methods utilized by the totalitarian government to maintain absolute control over a 
population serves to give the novella a grim level of scholastic technicality and 
precision. The technology that forms the fictitious Ingsoc (English Socialism) 
government’s central instrument of oppression was impossible at the time the book 
was composed. Known as the telescreen, it has the simultaneous function of a 
television, security camera and microphone. Government officials whose job it is to 
look for physical and mental signs of subversion permanently man it. It is present in 
the homes of all politically relevant members of society and cannot be turned off. 
Today, such technology is not only possible but all too real.1  
The safety and security of the state and its population is the justification 
often touted by western democracies when confronted on issues of the development 
and implementation of increasingly sophisticated surveillance technologies. Such 
justifications have benefited from increased gravitas amid the concerns of 
international Islamic fanaticism, which, since the events on 9/11, have been an ever-
intensifying phenomenon. To date, fifty-six deaths and three thousand and eighty-
three deaths have occurred in the UK and the US respectively as a result of Islamist 
terrorist attacks since 1990. Whether these arguments for increased surveillance have 
any real substance is a matter of great contention.  
                                                 
1Indeed, parallels can be drawn between the telescreen and the Optic Nerve program 
developed by GCHQ in 2008, which indiscriminately ‘intercepted and stored the webcam 
images of millions of Internet users. 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/27/gchq-nsa-webcam-images-internet-
yahoo) 
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In terms of justifications for surveillance measures, another parallel can be 
drawn with Nineteen Eighty-Four. It transpires that the Ingsoc government is 
subjecting its population to a state of wartime emergency. Citizens are constantly 
bombarded with telescreen propaganda, warning them of the dangers posed by 
foreign infiltration and underground revolutionary groups. There is some evidence 
to suggest that a war is indeed being waged with rival nations (at one point London 
is fire-bombed) but Orwell drops hints as to the fictional nature of the war throughout 
the novel, with attacks on the city merely being false-flags used by the government 
to justify and achieve popular support for their institution of increasingly oppressive 
measures. The uncertainty and sense of mystery inflicted on the reader as to the 
reality of the war or whether the material threat posed to the citizenry justifies this a 
state-of-emergency serves as an effective illustration as to the somewhat 
unfathomable and inscrutable nature of arguments justifying increased surveillance 
in the view of terrorist threats today. Is there a material connection between them? 
Are there any ulterior motives behind it?   
Although I will concede that a strict comparison between Nineteen Eighty-
four and modern Western society is somewhat overly dramatic, I feel the parallel 
serves to effectively highlight a key theme of this thesis and one that underlies its 
title; freedom and democracy vs. safety and security of the state. It is also poignant 
when one considers the fact that that, even in the 1940s, concerns on the use of 
surveillance technology as a tool of absolute oppression were present in people’s (or 
Orwell’s) minds given its limited development, compared to now. While Orwell’s 
inspirations are generally cited as the means and methods of the Soviet regimes (and 
their secret police organizations such as the NKVD2) in maintaining control over a 
population, one wonders what types of surveillance practices and technologies were 
utilized at the time (and before) that could have influenced his envisioning of the 
telescreen and its nefarious usage, in England (the place of his birth).  
Indeed, in order to provide the necessary information with which to give 
my thesis context, I believe a brief furor into the history of state surveillance methods 
and the reasoning for the implementation in England is necessary. Through this, I 
also hope to elucidate and compound some key concepts, which I will go on to 
explore in greater depth. 
 
                                                 
2 Senyonovna, Eugenia (1967), Journey into the Whirlwind, New York: Harcourt, Brace & 
World, Inc.  
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1.1 (b) Key concepts: What are privacy and comparative 
intrusiveness? 
 
 What does privacy actually mean? The topic has been one of 
extensive philosophical discussion and unwary scholars can easily find themselves 
in a conceptual quagmire. To discuss the ins and outs of privacy is beyond the scope 
of the thesis. However, I do wish to draw attention to some ways in which ideas of 
privacy may manifest itself and how, some situations, may be considered more 
intrusive of privacy than others. This serves as preparation for a later Chapter in 
which, I shall be assessing how sensitive ECHR jurisprudence is in assessing forms 
of surveillance technology in view of these.  
 Privacy has been academically discussed in the context of property3 
and intimacy4, with both of these elements possibly constituting elements of what 
some may call the private sphere or the private space. Indeed, the concept of privacy 
could be seen as the main influencing factor in the development of the common law 
maxim ‘…an Englishman’s home is his castle’ developed in Semayne’s Case5. The 
case was germane to the development of the Tort of trespass. It was also succeeded 
by another landmark case, Entick v. Carrington6, which – by virtue of this dictum – 
established limits to executive power and reaffirmed the rule of law, spearheaded by 
Lord Camden’s famous statement: “If it is law, it will be found in our books. If it not 
to be found there, it is not law.” The case in question details how ‘the King’s 
messengers’ broke into the plaintiff’s private property, caused extensive damage and 
confiscated property.  
Heidegger’s Critical Theory somewhat flies in the face of this through 
his contention that the private sphere is merely the place in which ‘one can be one’s 
authentic self’ as opposed to the others that inhabit the public sphere.7 In other words, 
it is the place in which one feels sufficiently comfortable to act and do with impunity. 
In this sense, the idea of privacy does not have a physical element per se, it is mental. 
An example of how the private sphere and the public sphere might converge is when 
one is taking a private phone call using a public telephone. The fact the operator of 
                                                 
3 Janice Richardson (2017), Law and the Philosophy of Privacy, Routledge  
4 ibid. 
5 Peter Semayne v. Richard Gresham (1604), 77 ER 194 
6 John Entick, (Clerk) v. Nathan Carrington and Three Others (1765), EWHC KB J98  
7 Zizi A. Papcharissi (2016), A Private Sphere: Democracy in a Digital Age, John Wiley & 
Sons, Ch. 6  
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the phone is talking candidly about intimate subjects with friends and family would 
place the call within the private sphere despite the fact the location of the phone is 
physically located in – what many would refer to as – a public place.  
This brief discourse on the nature of privacy provides the theoretic underpinning for 
the theory I wish to explore – that of comparative intrusiveness i.e. what makes an 
act a more serious violation of one’s private life than another? I feel it is helpful to 
view violations of private life as not simply an end but also a means. For example, 
someone whose house is broken into will feel as if it is a violation of their privacy, 
even if that person had chosen not to take anything from it. Thus, the perceived 
violation can be described as means. Conversely, if someone picked up a personal 
letter from the ground in a public place, then engaged in a mass dissemination of its 
private contents, then it is not the means that is the key violation, in this case, it is 
the end. It is through this scope that we can attempt to qualitatively assess the privacy 
implications of different types of surveillance. This section does not seek to draw 
any conclusions on whether certain means or ends are more intrusive than others. It 
simply provides the framework from which one can assess legal response to breaches 
of privacy. As stated, the ultimate goal is to draw a conclusion on how sensitive the 
ECtHR is on such issues.  
Below, I have attempted to create some categories that serve to 
highlight further how types of surveillance can be differentiated in terms of the 
means they employ and the content they harvest.  
 
Targeted and non-targeted  
The invention of CCTV in the mid-20th century arguably marked the first 
time when surveillance technology could be described as non-targeted; it enabling 
the indiscriminate observation of the public. Prior to this, the limitations of 
surveillance technology (such as the use of microphones for bugging or photographic 
equipment) meant that it was necessary to select a specific target - such as an 
individual suspected of committing a crime - beforehand. The same can be said for 
tracking devices, it requiring its physical placement on the person in question or their 
vehicle.  
Clarke’s description of personal data surveillance and mass data surveillance 
conveys a similar idea in the sense that; personal data surveillance “…monitors the 
9 
 
actions of one or more persons”8 while mass data surveillance is “where a group or 
large population is monitored in order to detect individuals of interest.”9 
 
Active observation and passive recording  
Some may seek to differentiate types of surveillance technology based on 
active observation (without recording the data in question) and passive recording 
(where observation of the recorded data may or may not occur at a later date).  Where 
active observation is concerned, legal barriers will involve the use of the technology 
itself (planting a tracking device in a car, for example, may require that certain 
evidential standards are met beforehand). Conversely, where passive recording is 
concerned, legal checks will be in regard to access to previously recorded data, such 
as CCTV footage.  
 
Private or public space  
 Whether surveillance technology is used in a private or public space may 
also be a matter of relevance. CCTV, for example, is commonly utilized in a public 
space, (a street) whereas the use of bugging devices on a landline phone would be 
an example of technology being used in a private space (such as in one’s own home).  
 
Public or private content 
Finally, some may be tempted to specify types of data as public content and 
other types as private content. While some may see the difference as hinging on 
whether that data is retrieved from a public or private space, others may see it as 
being related to the topical content of the data in question and whether it can be 
perceived as being related to personal matters. Of course, in line with Heidegger’s 
theorem, perhaps it is not the content itself that determines whether it is private, it is 
the fact that it was delivered on the presumption that it was private, and thus a person 
was operating within his personal sphere.  
 
1.2 A brief history of state surveillance 
 
The emergence of the first nation-states in the 16th century Europe saw an 
extensive use of undercover techniques to ‘protect their political, military and 
                                                 
8 Fuchs, C. & Boersma, K. (2012), Internet and Surveillance, The Challenges of Web 2.0 
and Social Media, Routledge Studies in Science, Technology and Society, pp.1  
9 ibid.  
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economic interests.’10 ‘Special bureaus’ were created by the state in order to collect 
intelligence on non-domestic enemies and rivals, a remit that bears a close 
resemblance to that of modern-day foreign intelligence agencies (such as UK’s MI6). 
Such institutions engaged in practices such as opening diplomatic correspondence, 
recruiting informants as well sending spies ‘to learn the secret intentions of their 
enemies and rivals.’11 Although these surveillance techniques have seen use in all 
parts of the world for millennia12 , the fact that offices were being specifically 
designed by the state to organize its usage on a mass scale is foundational to modern 
day conceptions.  
It wasn’t until the creation of the first ‘modern police apparatus13’ in 17th 
century France that we see states directing mass surveillance practices towards their 
own populations in view of protecting public order. Police were instructed to collect 
information on ‘potentially dangerous’ people and groups via ‘covert means’14. The 
institution of undercover policing polarized public and academic opinion. While 
early critics such as P. Manuel condemned it as tyrannical15, high-ranking members 
of the police saw it as an invaluable tool to the proper carrying-out of their duties16.  
 The state of undercover policing and state surveillance in England was far 
less developed at this time due to the maintenance of a ‘traditional system of 
decentralized parish policing’. 17  When reform was proposed in the form of the 
Metropolitan Police Improvement Act in 1829 (so that England’s system would be 
on par with France’s ‘modern system’) it was met with much resistance by those 
who feared they would be subject to similar levels of state tyranny18. Conversely, 
numerous philosophers and jurists who had a hand in developing the Bill regarded it 
as a necessary evil to maintain order in the industrial age.19 
The Bill was eventually passed by Parliament. Numerous initiatives were 
proposed, however, so as to render the English police as functionally distinct from 
                                                 
10 Cyrille Fijnaut & Gary T. Marx (1995), Police Surveillance in Comparative Perspective, 
Kluwer Law International, pp.2, §5  
11 ibid.  
12 Soustelle, Jacques (2002), The Daily Life of the Aztecas, Phoenix Press, pp.209  
13 ibid.  
14 Cyrille Fijnaut (1979), Opdat de macht een toevlucht zij? Een historische studie van het 
politie-apparaat al seen politieke instelling, Kluwer Law International, pp. 489 – 551, 580 - 
593 
15 P. Manuel (1790), La police de Paris dévoilée, J.B. Garnery  
16 Op.cit. Fijnaut & Marx  
17 J.J. Tobias (1979), Crime and Police in England (1700 – 1900), Gill and MacMillan, 
pp.25 – 56  
18 Op.cit. Fijnaut & Marx, pp.7 
19 L. Radzinowicz (1948 – 1956), A History of English Criminal Law and its 
Administration from 1750, London, pp. 417 - 522 
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France’s. This was in an effort to alleviate the aforementioned worries and suspicions 
of the public20. One of these was to encourage an institutional focus on preventative 
policing as opposed to repressive policing21. Interpretations of this meant that the 
police forces were required to wear distinctive uniforms, resulting in a highly visible 
police presence as opposed to a secret police presence.22  
Despite this, undercover policing was soon found to be a useful tool in 
conducting criminal investigations and the use of intelligence constables and 
detectives became increasingly common, as were the use of disguises (although not 
without strict orders23). This eventually led to the creation of a new department in 
187824. The remainder of the century saw the use of undercover policing become a 
matter of mere routine. This was encouraged by the perceived threat that Irish 
Nationalism and other popular movements had on the social order25.  
Covert policing was thrust into the limelight as the full details of the Soviet 
and Nazi legacy became apparent. As a result, it fell out of popular favor in Europe,26 
these regimes exemplifying the way in which the generalization and systematization 
of such tactics could be abused in order to subjugate a population. While they were 
being zealously developed and utilized in the US, modern European police forces 
were generally reluctant to follow their lead in response to this lack of popular 
support27. It was after President Nixon’s declaration of a war against drugs that saw 
the police of Western Europe readopted covert police tactics with a renewed fervor. 
The history of undercover policing and police surveillance in Europe 
reveals how the state security vs. freedom and democracy dichotomy has always 
been central to any debate on whether to increase or limit its usage. As mentioned, 
the Soviet Union (Orwell’s key reference point for Nineteen Eighty-four) shows the 
severe repercussions of tipping the balance too much in favor of state security, 
which, as a by-product, criminalizes that which threatens the political status quo.  
 
                                                 
20 Op.cit. Fijnaut & Marx, pp. 8  
21 S.H. Palmer (1988), Police and Protest in England and Ireland 1780 – 1850, CUP, pp.69 
- 79 
22 Op.cit. Fijnaut & Marx, pp.8  
23 D.G. Browne (1956), The Rise of Scotland Yard; A History of the Metropolitan Police, 
George G. Harap, pp. 113 – 127, 182 – 196   
24 Op.cit. Fijnaut & Marx, pp.9 
25 ibid.  
26 ibid. pp. 15 
27 ibid.  
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1.3 From old surveillance to new surveillance; comparative 
intrusiveness  
 
Coined by Gary T. Marx, new surveillance is defined as “the use of 
technical means to extract or create personal data. This may be taken from 
individuals or contexts.” 28  By contrast, old surveillance refers to non-technical 
methods of surveillance such as those mentioned in Chapter 1.1 (the interception of 
letters, eavesdropping etc.).  
Over the course of the 20th and 21st century, states have become 
increasingly reliant upon new surveillance methods to the point where old 
surveillance methods have largely fallen by the wayside. The methods themselves 
closely follow developing technologies, providing new ways through which personal 
data can be obtained, analyzed and accumulated.  
The current generation of new surveillance provides access to a broader 
range of personal data, which is capable of being accumulated en mass whilst being 
analyzed and stored in its entirety. Moreover, the data can be replicated an unlimited 
number of times and sent to an unlimited number of people. I will explore the nature 
of the current generation of new surveillance in more detail in Chapter 1.3.  
Other ways in which new surveillance can be distinguished from old 
surveillance is the way that is “less coercive” 29 in the sense that it can be carried out 
remotely thereby requiring no physical element (unlike eavesdropping or letter 
interception.). Thus, new surveillance can be considered easier and more readily 
available. Due to the affordable and accessible nature of sophisticated digital 
technology, new surveillance has also been characterized as “more democratized”30, 
non-state actors and private individuals also being able to obtain and utilize 
surveillance methods. Finally, new surveillance differs from old surveillance in the 
sense that, with the latter, “the surveillant knows things the subject doesn’t”, 31 while 
the former tends to involve the subject knowing what the surveillant knows. 32 
Something, which I am keen to highlight, is the concept of comparative 
intrusiveness and what types of restrictions should be placed on the usage of 
                                                 
28 Marx, Gary T., ‘What’s new about the “new surveillance”? Classifying for change and 
continuity’ (2002), Surveillance and Society, Volume 1 (1): 9 – 29, pp.12)  
29 ibid, pp. 28 
30 ibid.  
31 ibid. pp.29 
32 ibid. pp.29 
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surveillance certain technologies in response to an arguably increasing degree of 
intrusiveness. As new surveillance develops and improves in the carrying out of its 
intended function, is the law adequately adjusting in response to this in order to 
protect people’s rights, privacy, and autonomy? 
I will continue by describing some forms of new surveillance technology 
and then describing how they can be implicated in a discussion of comparative 
intrusiveness and privacy.  
 
1.4 Methods of new surveillance  
 
1.4 (a) the pre-digital age 
The development of the first photographic cameras (able to capture still 
and moving images), the first portable microphones, the first 
radio/telecommunications technologies and the first satellite technologies in the 
early-mid 20th century revolutionized the ways in which the police were able to 
collect and process evidence of criminal activity.  
There are numerous instances of police agencies utilizing bugging or 
wiretapping in the course of criminal investigations; listening in to private 
conversations 33  through the interception of ‘telecommunications, or electronic 
communications, or by using listening devices to overhear and record 
conversations.’ 34  
States have also been known to access telecommunications data in the 
course of investigations. Telecommunications Service Providers (TSPs) store 
information relating to calls made by its clients such as their duration and frequency. 
Under certain circumstances, TSPs can be compelled to make this information 
available to the police. Such data can also be obtained through the use of metering 
devices. Police access to telecommunications data formed the crux of the ECHR case 
Malone v. the United Kingdom.  
British police officials saw the potential use of photography as a tool for 
evidence gathering as early as 189535, with Sir Howard Vincent stating that ‘the 
                                                 
33 Peter Wright (1987), Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior Intelligence 
Officer, Stoddart, pp. 79 – 83  
34 ibid.  
35 Paul Knepper (2009), Urban Crime Prevention, Surveillance, and restorative Justice: 
Effects of Social Technologies, CRC Press, pp.82  
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utility of photography in the pursuit of criminals cannot be overestimated.’36 Indeed, 
there are countless examples of still and moving photography forming an intrinsic 
part of criminal investigations throughout the 20th century. Photos stored in Britain’s 
National Archives showed how London’s Metropolitan Police subjected the 
suffragettes to a campaign of photographic surveillance who were regarded as, at the 
time, to be the ‘biggest threat to the British Empire.’37  
The emergence of the first satellite technologies in 1957 (when the Soviet 
Union launched the first ever artificial satellite into Earth’s orbit) ushered in the 
development of the Global Positioning System (GPS). Any device containing a ‘GPS 
receiving module’ can have its precise coordinates remotely calculated. The 
surreptitious placement of these devices on vehicles or individuals can allow their 
exact locations to be recorded and stored. This data can then be analyzed the device’s 
operator. 38  GPS tracking has seen extensive use by police to track and gather 
evidence on suspects.39 It is also used as a form of punishment with courts ordering 
the attachment of electronic tags to convicted persons, enabling police to keep a 
constant eye on their movements.40 The use of GPS tracking in a police investigation 
formed the basis of a case brought under the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR): Uzun v. Germany. 
A technological descendent of moving photography, the very first Close 
Circuit Television (CCTV) systems emerged in the mid-20th century.41 The earliest 
systems were unable to record footage and therefore required constant monitoring 
by human operators. This remained the case until ‘magnetic reel-to-reel tape 
media’42 was developed, which was subsequently replaced by the Analogue Video 
Cassette Recorder (VCR). CCTV cameras linked to a VCR could be left to passively 
record, leaving human operators free to review the footage at a later date.  
                                                 
36 C.E. Howard Vincent (1900), The Police Code and the General Manual of the Criminal 
Law for the British Empire, Kent & Co  
37 Dominic Casciani, ‘Spy Pictures of Suffragettes Revealed’, BBC News Online, 3 
October 2003 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/3153024.stm) 
38 Gray (2013), Leon, How does GPS Work, The Rosen Publishing Group, pp.38  
39 Karen M. Hess (2013), Police Operations: Theory and Practice, Cengage Learning, pp. 
106   
40 David Wright (2014), Surveillance in Europe, Routledge, pp.388  
41 Dornberger, Walter (1954), V-2, Ballantine, pp.14  
42 Kruegle, Herman (2011), CCTV Surveillance: video Practices and Technology, 
Butterworth-Heinemann, pp. 279  
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According to media reports, the UK is currently the ‘most watched nation’ 
by CCTV43, with an estimated 1.85 million cameras in 2011.44 The majority of these 
are owned and operated by ‘private companies or individuals’ with government 
cameras being numbered at a comparatively miniscule 52,000.45  Whether these 
figures are accurate, however, is difficult to gauge given the fact the estimates vary 
greatly from source to source. It can be said with a matter of relative certainty that 
the government’s ownership and operation of CCTV is comparatively limited to that 
of private actors.  
 
1.4 (b) The Digital Revolution 
The computerization of information that marked the digital revolution (the 
change from analog electronic technology to digital electronics) is said to have 
started somewhere between the 1950s and 1970s.46 It completely revolutionized the 
way in which information was stored and transmitted. Photographic, video and audio 
surveillance were all now capable of being stored and transmitted in a digital format, 
presenting some key advantages over their analog predecessors.  
One benefit of the digital format is that it enabled one to make infinite 
copies of the original data without suffering degradation in quality. This would be 
the same if one were to make a copy of a copy. Analog data, on the other hand, 
suffers from a phenomenon known as generational loss47, each copy of a copy 
experiencing an incremental increase in degradation. Moreover, the process of 
making a digital copy is significantly easier than making an analog copy.48 Another 
benefit of the digital format is that the original copy is less likely to experience any 
form of data corruption if stored properly. In the case of magnetic media (i.e. cassette 
tapes), the magnetic tapes will, over time, lose their magnetic orientation. This leads 
to the increasing degradation of the data in question. 
 The effectiveness of noise reduction techniques is the third benefit of 
digital media. Like analog data, digital data can suffer from noise, which is especially 
                                                 
43 BBC News, ‘UK, Most Watched Nation by CCTV’, Tuesday, 21 July 2009, 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/8160757.stm) 
44 See. Op.cit Colvin, Madeleine, Under Surveillance  
45 Big Brother Watch, ‘The Price of Privacy: How local authorities spent £515m on CCTV 
in four years’, 2002, (https://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/files/priceofprivacy/Price_of 
_privacy_2012.pdf) 
46 Inder Sidhu (2016), The Digital Revolution: How Connected Digital Innovations Are 
Transforming You Industry, Company and Career, FT Press  
47 Richard W. Kroon (2014), A/V A to Z: An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Media, 
Entertainment and Other Audio-visual Terms, McFarland, pp.310  
48 Peter Aksoy & Laura DeNardis (2007), Informational technology in Theory, Cengage 
Learning, pp.32 
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‘prevalent in all analog and digital systems used for information communication, 
storage, and processing.’49 However, with digital systems, this noise can be more 
‘effectively filtered.’50 Whereas an analog audio recording may be rendered of no 
use due to noise, with no means of reducing it, in the case of a digital audio recording, 
methods of noise reduction may serve to render it useable.  
Some other advantages include 1) high speed 2) high level of security and 
3) simplicity of transmission51 (see. the next chapter). In terms of surveillance, the 
invention of digital technology and usage in methods of surveillance (i.e. audio 
recordings and CCTV) can be seen as having numerous implications concerning 
privacy. For the first time, there existed the capacity for one’s personal data to be 
reproduced in its original form ad infinitum, stored in posterity and, moreover, 
modified and transmitted much more reliably. It is at this point that we come to the 
computer age and the invention of internal and external network systems, otherwise 
known as the intranet and the Internet.  
 
1.4 (c) The Computer Age  
The Computer Age occurred parallel to The Digital Age and the terms are 
often used interchangeably52. For me, whereas the former epoch was more concerned 
with the development of the relevant technology, the latter is more a description of 
the time when information was subject to widespread computerization. 
Over the course of The Computer Age, the capacity of digital technology 
to store53, transmit54 and compute55 information experienced veritable leaps and 
bounds. Moreover, the epoch also encompasses the creation and proliferation of the 
first ‘home computer’ in the 1970s (the first one to appear in the USA entitled the 
Altair 8800). It saw immediate and overwhelming commercial success. Over the 
course of the century, ‘home computers’ have managed to infiltrate the vast majority 
of businesses, homes, government buildings, and research facilities. Today, over 
83% of US households own a computer.56 The fact that the computer became a 
                                                 
49 ibid. pp.33 
50 ibid.  
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52 See. Castells, M. (1999), The Information Age, Volumes 1-2: economy, Society and 
Culture, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell  
53 Hilbert, Martin & López, Priscila, ‘The World's Technological Capacity to Store, 
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54 ibid. 
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veritable deus ex machina for all aspects of human life (home, work, and 
government) coupled with their popularity in the developed world eventuated in the 
radical expansion of the types and amount of personal data that was being digitally 
stored.  
The invention of the Internet, and later, the World Wide Web in 198957 
enabled it so that data could ‘…be collected, stored, analyzed, transferred, accessed, 
monitored, and solicited’58 in large volumes and at terrific speed. It was not long 
before new types of surveillance technology were being developed in lieu of this era-
defining invention. The surveillance capabilities one could possess by virtue of the 
mass usage of the World Wide Web were too great to ignore and it is not a hard task 
to foresee what ramifications such surveillance technology may have on issues of 
personal data protection/privacy. I will seek to explore this in more detail in the next 
chapter.  
 
1.4 (d) the Internet and Surveillance   
 Table 1.159 in the book Internet 2.0 relates how the various ‘qualities 
of the internet’ serve to augment the surveillance capabilities of anyone seeking to 
use it for such a purpose. These ‘qualities’ are listed as including:  
 
1) Global communication: one can remotely collect many ‘data items’ from ‘certain 
individuals’60 all over the world.  
 
2) Real-time global communication: one can monitor communications as they 
happen, thereby allowing for the active ‘coordination of social movements.’ 
 
3) High-speed data transmission: The existence of high-speed data transmission, 
allows for high-speed surveillance systems with large amounts of data being 
transferred globally.  
 
                                                 
57 Bill Stewart, ‘IPTO – Information Processing Techniques Office, The Living Internet’, 
2000, (http://www.livinginternet.com/i/ii_ipto.htm) 
58 Fuchs, Christian (2012), Internet and Surveillance; The Challenges of Web 2.0 and 
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59 ibid. pp.16 – 19  
60 ibid.  
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4) Miniaturization: due to the ever-increasing storage capacity and cheapness of 
chips, the amount of personal data that can be stored for personal surveillance is 
always increasing.   
 
5) Data multiplicity: Something that was mentioned before, this term refers to the 
fact that personal data, via the Internet, can be copied ‘easily, cheaply, and endlessly’ 
and that ‘copying does not destroy the original data.’61 
 
6) Multimedia: This describes how the Internet is ‘multisensory’ nature, allowing 
such data as ‘text, sound, image, animation, and video…’ to be subject to 
surveillance through it.   
 
7) Hypertext: Links between people can be ‘more easily observed’ as a result of the 
networked ‘information structures.’62 
 
8) Online cooperation: People share information and cooperate in projects which is 
something that could be subjected to surveillance.  
 
9) Decontextualisation: Personal information may not be accompanied by suitable 
context, encouraging the practice of ‘speculative and pre-emptive surveillance.’63 
 
10) Derealisation: The line between fiction and reality can be blurred for surveillant. 
As a result, wrong interpretation may be made by the surveillant, which may subject 
the surveilled to increased scrutiny.  
 
11) Emotive Internet: People express themselves through the Internet in an emotive 
fashion, rendering their intimate characteristics and emotions knowable to the 
surveillant.  
 
12) Ubiquitous Internet: The Internet formed part of all aspects of daily life.  
  
I have used streamlined definitions for some of these terms due to 
their largely self-explanatory, but for more information see. Pp.16 – 19, Fuchs, 
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Internet Surveillance 2.0). One thing that the table does effectively highlight is the 
pure power of the Internet and its complete suitability as a medium for surveillance 
activities. Through it, there are essentially no technological limitations as to the 
amount and type of personal data a person can duplicate, store, transfer, and monitor!   
According to Starke-Meyerring and Gurak, there are ‘three kinds of 
Internet surveillance technologies: 1) surveillance of personal data captured from 
general Internet use, 2) surveillance of personal data captured by using specialized 
Internet services…’ and ‘3) technologies and practices designed to access data from 
Internet users.’64 I will go on to look at these in some detail. 
 
1.4 (e) Internet surveillance tools  
Although the global intelligence community remain reticent in 
concern to the means and methods of Internet surveillance they choose to employ in 
the course of their duties (as well as any new methods being developed with their 
oversight), the ways in which government agencies are able to remotely monitor 
Internet communications is by no means a mystery to a significant minority of the 
general population. This is not only by virtue of the various leaks of classified 
government information that has occurred over the years (such as the Ed Snowden 
debacle65), but also because such methods have been employed by so-called civilian 
hackers (for testing network security measures) ever since the world wide web 
became a matter of public access.66 Notwithstanding, the methods employed by 
crackers and hackers to remotely access information and communications derive 
from similar practices employed on internal and local networks that existed 
beforehand. Indeed, people were employed to implement network security measures 
and test them (something known as security hacking) since its invention.  
Spyware is a variety of malware (malicious software), which is 
specifically designed to gather personal data without the subject’s knowledge and 
may also reproduce and sent it to other entities without the subject’s consent. 67 One 
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variety of spyware is known as the Trojan horse given the fact that the software is 
specifically designed to mislead the subject as to its true nature, thus allowing the 
user surreptitious access to personal data. The Trojan horse may be disguised as a 
benign download68 or email attachment (emails sent repeatedly and deliberately with 
the intent of infecting subjects’ computers with malware is often termed spam). They 
can collect many types of data, including but not limited to: Internet surfing habits, 
user logins, and credit card information.  
Phishing describes the practice of tricking subjects into providing 
sensitive information. This method is particularly interesting in the sense that shows 
how methods of Internet surveillance don’t necessarily have to be technological, 
instead relying on traditional subversive methods which would have been used in the 
times preceding new surveillance (see. chapter 1.4). The key differences between 
phishing and old surveillance methods lie in the fact of the Internet’s speed, 
derealisation, decontextualization, ubiquity and it’s multimedia capabilities (see. 
chapter 1.4(d)); meaning that phishing can certainly be argued to be more intrusive 
than an undercover policeman or spy.  
Phishing often takes the form of an email or an instant message, which 
is disguised so as to appear to be from a trustworthy source (such as a bank or 
government agency). The email will often ask the subject to provide their passwords 
and credit card details. The subject, being convinced by the message’s apparently 
legitimate nature, will willingly oblige. The sender will then use the information for 
malicious purposes. 69 
Packet sniffers are types of hardware or software that can be used to 
‘grab’ packets of data from any kind of network, including the Internet. Typically 
they are used for network related diagnostics such as monitoring traffic or being 
notified for potential intrusions. In terms of surveillance capabilities, they can be 
used for the collection of sensitive information such as login details and ‘what 
information is being exchanged between two parties.’ 70 
No reference is given to any of these three surveillance methods in related 
UK legislation. Indeed, as I will go on to elucidate later in the thesis, such legislation 
as the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, provides absolutely no detail as to the specific 
means and methods employed by security agencies in the course of Internet 
surveillance. Instead, these are encapsulated by the extremely broad terms: 1) 
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interference and 2) interception. That said, these terms do serve to include such 
methods as malware, phishing and packet sniffers within its ambit, in line with their 
very implied meaning (interference, for example, is often mentioned in the context 
of physical equipment which does bear a close resemblance to the practice of packet 
sniffing). Of course, this is mere speculation and this is one of the frustrating things 
about the UK’s surveillance legislation. Of course, depending on the specific 
methods employed, it may alter the perception of whether the act itself is more or 
less intrusive and, thus, more or less deserving of restriction. If the methods are 
hidden in vague terms, then this is much harder to do.  
Another method of Internet surveillance is known as ISP (Internet Service 
Provider) log file access. ISPs are commonly understood as “’an organization that 
sells access to the Internet.’ – an access provider.” 71 Some examples of ISPs include 
BT in the UK or Telia in Sweden. Such organizations are able to maintain logs (in 
the forms of a Uniform Resource Locator (URL) or every webpage their clients visit, 
the length of the time they spend on them and the searches they make. This is made 
possible through monitoring the requests made by the client’s Internet protocol (IP) 
address to other IP addresses (such as a website). An IP address is assigned to the 
client upon subscription to the service and represents the location of the client’s 
device (such as a computer or mobile phone) on the network. Naturally, the ISP 
knows or can find out the name client’s name and location. These logs can be stored 
for an indefinite period and can be requested by/sold to third parties.  
IPS log file access is directly referred to by UK surveillance legislation 
within provisions concerning ‘data retention’ and ‘obtaining communications data’. 
They stipulate measures on the IPS mandatory retention of ISP log files, as well as 
the circumstances in which they can be provided to security (and other government 
agencies). I will go into more detail on the precise meaning of these terms in the next 
chapter.  
The next method of Internet surveillance I wish to highlight is known as 
Open Source data collection. This refers to data that is freely accessible on the 
Internet or otherwise and the collection of this data through human or automated 
means. The data in question then can be stored, replicated, analyzed and transmitted. 
One might be tempted to liken this method of Internet surveillance with CCTV 
cameras, passively observing and recording public activity. The aforementioned 
qualities of the Internet make open source data collection arguably much more 
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intrusive and insidious, however. These qualities include the derealized, the 
decontextualized, and emotive nature of the Internet, coupled with the multimedia 
aspect and its data multiplicity capabilities (see. Chapter 1.3(4)).  
Given the fact the personal information in question is being willingly and 
knowingly placed in a public space (although whether the Internet can be considered 
a public or private space is still a matter of debate, especially concerning social 
networking sites72) whereby it can, without the usage of hacking, be subject to 
surveillance (not only by the government but also members of the public), invite the 
question of whether legal safeguards should actually exist for this method of 
surveillance. In terms of UK surveillance legislation, there is a distinctive hole in 
this regard. In terms of CCTV, there are safeguards in concerning the installation of 
the cameras as well as access to the recorded data. Given the nature of the Internet 
and their surveillance ramifications, should not such legal limitations also exist for 
the surveillance of open source data? One might claim that this should not be the 
case, given the fact that the data available is subject to knowledge and consent, unlike 
with CCTV footage.  
Whether legislation safeguarding against the surveillance of open-source 
data should be enacted is beyond the scope of this Chapter, but it does serve to 
highlight the relevance of debates concerning what constitutes privacy as well as 
whether one form of surveillance can be considered more or less intrusive than 
another, and what methodology should be applied in order to determine this. I do not 
wish to abandon this very important debate, however, and I will go one to consider 
it as part of a separate chapter.  
 
1.4 (f) Conclusion to the overview 
I feel that the preceding chapter goes to provide a useful theoretical 
starting-point from which to cast a critical eye at the main topic of the thesis; the 
legality of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 under Article 8 European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR). After a discussion of its legality, I will seek to engage in 
the date of whether the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) jurisprudence is 
adequately equipped to fully and adequately engage with concepts of privacy in 
relation to the various methods that go to constitute the phenomenon known as 
internet surveillance. Primary to this debate are considerations of the ECtHR’s 
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interpretation of privacy in line with the ever-evolving alternatives, as well as, to 
what degree, they fully engage and apply the concept of the comparative 
intrusiveness when considering methods of surveillance. Have they fully accounted 
for the wide-ranging implications of the Internet?  
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2 The Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
 
2.1 Overview 
 The Investigatory Powers Act 201673 (IPA 2016) is the latest in a long 
line of legislation geared towards providing the government, the UK Intelligence 
Community, and police agencies with a veritable tool-kit of surveillance powers, 
including but not limited to internet surveillance. I will embark on a detailed 
overview of the Act, it superseding and amending all previous surveillance and 
investigatory legislation to form the legal keystone of the UK government’s on-going 
surveillance regime. Once I have outlined its most important elements, I will analyze 
the Act in relation to its legality under Article 8 ECHR and provide further 
commentary on notions of comparative intrusiveness; is ECtHR jurisprudence 
sufficiently well equipped to deal with the privacy ramifications of internet 
surveillance legislation such as this?  
 
2.1 (a) Preceding Legislation  
 The IPA 2016’s legal ancestors reveal how susceptible surveillance 
powers are to increasing state security concerns (especially those related to terrorism 
and other forms of serious criminality) and developing technology. Over the course 
of time, surveillance powers have seen a gradual expansion, addition, and 
amendment in response to these factors, with the IPA 2016 being its latest 
incarnation. This stream of legislation started with The Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 200074 (RIPA) and was followed by; The Terrorism Act 2006, The 
Serious Crime Act 2007, The Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, The Policing and Crime 
Act 2009, The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, The Data 
Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 201475 (DRIP), The Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2016 and The Serious Crime Act 2016.  
The earliest of these acts, RIPA, was drafted precisely to help the 
police and security services adequately deal with the growth of Internet 
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communications and the development of new methods of encryption at the beginning 
of the new millennium.76  
RIPA covers a range of surveillance methods within five broad 
categories, including methods of old surveillance77. Two of these five categories 
were particularly controversial, they being the first of their kind to consolidate 
methods of Internet surveillance in substantive law. They are referred to by the Act 
as ‘the acquisition of communications data (e.g. billing data) and ‘the interception of 
communications’.78  
In 2014, its equally controversial successor, DRIP, legislated an 
additional category known as enforced ‘data retention’.79 Instead of the DRIP being 
drafted in response to a burgeoning technological development, it was in fact 
rushed80 through Parliament in order to retain numerous data retention powers in the 
aftermath of a European Court of Justice (ECJ) decision. The decision effectively 
struck down the EU’s Data Retention Directive81  whose main objective was to 
‘harmonize Member States’ provisions concerning the retention of certain data…’82 
As such, advocates of DRIP insisted that it was doing no more than preserving ‘the 
status quo’ 83 , with EU law having already laid the groundwork for the 
implementation of such powers. Moreover, many supporting Members of Parliament 
(MPs) lauded the Act’s facilitation of numerous powers that were seen as necessary 
in tackling a heightened terrorist threat as well as pedophilia84.  
In a High Court ruling85, The DRIP was subsequently found to be in 
contravention of EU law and ordered that the act should be ‘disapplied’. The decision 
was based on the fact that s.1 of DRIP did not ‘lay down clear and precise rules 
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providing for access to and use of communications data’86 which was the same 
reason the aforementioned directive was struck down by the ECJ. It was this that 
prompted the developments of the IPA’s draft bill.  
The three categories of Internet surveillance previously highlighted, 
1) acquisition of communications 2) interception of communications and 3) data 
retention, form an enduring element of the IPA. Decidedly vague in nature, covering 
a range of powers and obligations, I will seek to examine these in more detail in 
future sections. 
 
2.1 (b) The Drafting of the Act: Parliamentary debate and public 
responses 
 The draft bill, dubbed by many media houses as the ‘Snooper’s 
Charter’87, caused something of a furor with the seemingly ‘wide-ranging spying 
powers’88 it grants the UK’s intelligence agencies, the police, and numerous other 
government bodies. Terms such as ‘extreme surveillance’89 have been frequently 
employed to describe its content, accompanied by claims that it is ‘unmatched by 
any other country in Western Europe…or the US’90 and that it is a ‘beacon for 
despots everywhere.’91 Many have highlighted the speedy and quiet fashion though 
which the draft bill was proposed, debated and passed through Parliament, it only 
gaining wider public attention until it was already law. Some have interpreted this as 
a deliberate tactical decision, the implication being that the government was worried 
about public scrutiny beleaguering its passage.92  
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 Members of Parliament (MPs) who opposed the passing of the IPA’s 
draft bill have vocalized the concern that ‘the surveillance activities proposed…go 
way too far and too fast…are vaguely described, disproportionate and lack critical 
safeguards.’ 93 One way in which the IPA draft bill was considered as going too far 
was in the way that the act does not merely concern ‘national security, crime, and 
public safety’, it also involves itself in ‘a long list of other purposes – from tax 
collection to economic well-being and public health’ with ICRs being made available 
to a long list of government agencies, other than the police and security services 
including Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HRMC) and the National Health 
Service (NHS).94 
Other MPs have echoed arguments previously made by infamous 
whistle-blower Edward Snowden, suggesting that such legislation casts the net too 
wide, it resulting in the harvest of an amount of data far too inordinately large to be 
of any use to the security services. As such, it is deemed ‘counterintuitive’ due to the 
fact that the likely result will be a worsening ‘in their work rate.’ 95 Criticism has also 
concerned the draft bill’s weak provision of a ‘judicial oversight of powers’96.  
The bill’s proponents, on the other hand, hold it as vital to the work 
of law enforcement and the security services 97  whilst providing for ‘stronger 
safeguards and greater openness’98. Indeed, many of the justifications made for the 
IPA are in the same vein of those made for RIPA; that such laws are necessary in 
order to cope with an increasingly sophisticated breed of criminal and terrorist in this 
‘…digital age’ 99  we now live in. The usage of digital technology by criminal 
enterprises and terrorist organization in order to increase the efficiency and secrecy 
of their activities is an undeniable fact. Prima facie, it makes complete sense that 
legislation should constantly be amended and expanded in order to stay ahead of the 
increasing sophistication of terrorists and criminals. One only needs to do some 
rudimentary research into the ISIS propaganda machine to see how the Internet can 
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be effectively utilized to influence and orchestrate worldwide terrorist attacks and 
‘radicalize and recruit’100 young, disaffected men and women.  
MI5 chief, Andrew Parker, has testified as to the efficacy of such 
legislation in the fight against criminality and terrorism, insisting that certain 
provisions within the act will ‘help join the dots in complex…investigations’101 
which, in turn, ‘saves lives.’ 102  Indeed, there has been a general governmental 
insistence that, without the IPA, crimes ‘enabled by email and Internet will go 
undetected and unpunished.’103 
This viewpoint has received wide acknowledgment by numerous 
politicians and other security officials. Indeed, it was reported that powers included 
in the IPA are ‘used in 95% of serious and organized criminal investigations handled 
by the Crown Prosecution Services (the CPS)’104 and has ‘played a significant role 
in every Security Service counter-terrorism operation over the last decade.’105 It has 
also been claimed to be effective in the arrest of ‘repeat burglars, robbers and drug 
dealers.’106 Reference is also made to a number of infamous murder, terrorist and 
child grooming cases where communications data (a component part of the IPA and 
RIPA) has played an important part including the: Oxford and Rochdale child 
grooming cases107, the murder of Holly Wells and Jessica Chapman108 and the 2007 
Glasgow Airport Terror Attack.109 Parliamentarian, Yvette Cooper, highlights that 
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recent Child Exploitation and Online Protection Centre investigations have resulted 
in the arrest of ‘200 suspects and identified 132 children who were at risk of abuse’110 
through the use of communications data. She compares this against the success rates 
of German police of whom, not possessing such rights of access, have only been able 
to investigate ‘a handful of cases.’111 Indeed, communications data is claimed to be 
utilized by the UK police in the course of 1) ‘piecing together the activities of 
suspects, victims and vulnerable people’ 2) ‘proving or disproving alibis’ 3) 
‘identifying links between potential criminals’ 4) ‘tying suspects to a crime scene’ 
and 5) ‘finding a vulnerable person who is at risk of imminent harm.’ 112 
Notwithstanding, the IPA has also been praised for increasing the transparency of 
such activities, making powers, which were previously a ‘closely guarded’, a matter 
of public knowledge.113 
As is revealed by public and political responses the draft bill of the 
IPA the argument boils down to safety and security vs. freedom and democracy, as 
was highlighted in Chapter 1.2. It is beyond the ambit of this chapter to decide on 
whether the provisions included in the IPA have struck the correct balance in 
reference to these dual standards. The opinions I have related, however, will provide 
some fuel towards considerations of necessity, a concept that I will engage with upon 
my analysis of ECHR jurisprudence later in the thesis.  
 
2.2 The IPA 2016; overview and structure 
The IPA 2016 is an extensive piece of legislation, the text of the Act 
consisting of precisely 291 pages. These are divided into nine Parts, with each Part 
also being segmented into numerous Chapters, Sections, and Subsections (i.e. IPA 
2016, Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 18, §1 (a)). The Parts functions as the main clauses 
of the Act. Following the main clauses are ten Schedules. These are used to go into 
greater detail on how the preceding clauses are to be implemented in practice. These 
are also divided into Chapters, Sections, and Subsections.  
 In this section of the thesis, I will attempt to succinctly highlight and 
summarize the salient elements of the Act in relation to its implementation of laws 
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relating to Internet Surveillance methods. Instead of approaching the Act clause by 
clause chronologically, thereby merely condensing reams of text, I will be going in-
between Parts, utilizing the Act’s Explanatory Notes and the aforementioned 
Schedules. This is not only for the sake of brevity; it is also to elicit the Act’s true 
and accurate meaning. Notwithstanding, a lot of the following text will be an 
interpretation of how the Act can be divided so as to show each individual 
Surveillance tool it legislates for, how they can be used and their implications 
regarding the Right to Privacy.  Moreover, in order to aid this interpretation, I will 
also be utilizing non-source 3rd party material so as to try to adequately define 
terminology that the Act arguably hazards to leave ambiguous in meaning.  
 Before commencing, it is important to note that the IPA 2016 is not 
intended to strictly apply the Internet. Indeed, the usage of such non-internet-specific 
terms such as ‘telecommunications’ and ‘telecommunications operators’ means that 
the inclusion of Internet communications within the Act’s ambit is implied instead 
of express. This is obviously done to avoid the exclusion other technologies such as 
wireless telegraphy (radio) and the telephone.  This is understandable given that, as 
mentioned earlier, the IPA 2016 is considered as an update to legislation enacted in 
the pre-internet era. For the purposes of this thesis, ‘telecommunication operators’ 
will be taken to mean ‘Internet service providers’ (ISPs) of whom ‘provide services 
where customers, guests or members of the public’114 are provided with access to 
Internet services.  
 
 2.3 (a) The alternate forms of Internet Surveillance in the IPA 
2016  
 Parts 2 – 5 are the meat of the Act, serving to describe and divide it 
into, what I deem to be, five main categories of Internet surveillance powers. These 
five main categories of Internet surveillance are as follows:  
 
 ‘Interception of communications’115  
 ‘Obtaining communications data’116 
 ‘Retention of communications data’117 
                                                 
114 Home Office, ‘DRAFT  Code of Practice; Interception of Communications’, December 
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 ‘Equipment Interference’118 
 ‘Bulk personal datasets’ 
 ‘Targeted and bulk powers’ 
 
Prima facie, the headings of these Parts may seem fairly self-explanatory in 
what they permit or, conversely, disconcertingly broad. Indeed, those with 
knowledge of the technological tools that companies and institutions have at their 
disposal may err on the side of these being too broad. To the contrary for those that 
have no such knowledge; they might imagine the process of interception to be a fairly 
linear affair and have minimal desire to explore this further. In any case, I will go 
through these categories in turn and elicit their meaning in more detail by analyzing 
the precise terminology applied within the context of the Act. I will start by analyzing 
the meanings of ‘Interception’, ‘Obtaining’, ‘Retention’, ‘Interference’, ‘Bulk 
personal Dataset’ and ‘Targeted and bulk powers’.  
 
2.3 (b) ‘Interception of communications’  
Interception is defined as acts, which include ‘modifying or interfering with 
the system and monitoring transmission made by means of the system.’119 Inherent 
to the definition is that the consequence of the acts in question ‘must be to make the 
content of the communication available to a person who is not the sender or the 
intended recipient.’120 The act must be committed at the ‘relevant time’121 which is 
dictated as meaning any time in which the ‘communication is being transmitted or 
any time when the communication is stored in or by the system.’122 With reference 
to digital communications, the term ‘system’ refers not only to Internet servers but 
also the storage memory of digital devices such as phones or tablets of either the 
sender or the recipient.123 Thus, ‘interception’ can occur at every point in the timeline 
of a communication’s drafting, transmission, and arrival, using any/all technological 
means to retrieve the communication in question. 
If one takes an email as an example of a communication, the Act 
differentiates between the forms of ‘data’ that can be taken from it. These are 
‘content data’ and ‘secondary data.’124 ‘Content data’ is fairly self-explanatory, it 
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simply consisting of the transmitted content whatever it may be (text, photo, voice 
recording etc.). Secondary data should be ‘…comprised in, included as part of, 
attached to or logically associated with the communication’125 but should not reveal 
the ‘meaning’ of the communication itself126 (i.e. the message contained in an email 
remains private) and is considered ‘less intrusive than content’ data.127 Secondary 
data is divided into types; ‘systems data or identifying data.’128  
‘Identifying data’ refers to any ‘data, which may be used to identify, or assist 
in identifying any person, apparatus, system or service…any event…or the locations 
of any person, event or thing.’129 With reference to ‘event’, identifying data can be 
used to establish the fact of its existence, ‘the method or pattern of the event’130 and 
‘the time or duration of the event.’131 In real terms, one could use an example of a 
digital photograph. Data attached to the photograph may be used to identify the date 
it was taken (i.e. a digital time stamp) or where it was taken (i.e. network location 
data) which could lead to the identification of the person who took it. This can be 
achieved without actually seeing the photograph itself.  
‘Systems data’ is ‘data which enables or facilitates, identifies or describes 
anything connected with enabling of facilitating’ 132  the function of a 
‘telecommunications system.’ 133  This description does not mean much to the 
layman, whether he is a legal professional or otherwise. Indeed, without an in-depth 
knowledge of how network infrastructures work, it is difficult to ascertain to what 
extent the surveillance of such data can potentially infringe notions of privacy. The 
Act’s DRAFT Code of Practice refers to the use of an application on a phone as an 
example, the ‘systems data’ being the data exchanged between the phone and the 
‘application server, which makes the application work in a certain way.’134 ‘What 
might this materially say about a person?’ is a question that is tough to answer.  
 
2.3 (c) ‘Obtaining communications data’ 
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Contained in Part 3 of the IPA 2016, this power enables the authorities to 
‘obtain…communications data from a telecommunications operator.’ 135  Unlike 
‘interception’, the power to ‘obtain’ implies the cooperation, facilitation, and 
knowledge of the telecommunications operator. Indeed, in simple terms, the 
authority makes a demand for the data in question and telecommunications operator 
provides it. I will explain the finer details later in the chapter.  
‘Communications data’ is described as the ‘who, where, when, how and with 
whom of communications, but not its content.’136 Communications data is divided 
into two subcategories: 1) entity data and 2) events data. The former concerns 
identifiers associated with the customer accounts of telecommunication services. In 
terms of Internet services, this would include Internet Protocol Addresses (IPs), 
something that is allocated to customers by the service provider.137 The latter refers 
to ‘the fact that someone sent or received an email…text or social media message. It 
also includes data relating to which Wi-Fi hotspots the device connected to.’138 
Moreover, entity data also consists of ‘internet connection records’ which can be 
used to demonstrate whether a certain device connected to a certain website or 
‘accessed an online communications system.’139 Despite this, such data cannot be 
used to determine what the individual did on that service.  
In the DRAFT Code of Practice, communications data is implied as being 
an element of secondary data, with secondary data constituting a ‘broader category 
of data.’ 140  It is logical to suggest that secondary data encompasses both the 
aforementioned entity and event data.  
 
2.3 (d) ‘Retention of Communications data’  
Part 4 Section 87 of the IPA 2016 ‘…provides a power to require 
telecommunications operators to retain communications data.’141 Once the power 
has been invoked, selected communications data must be retained for a maximum of 
12 months.142 This can then be ‘obtained’ via the aforementioned legal means.  
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2.3 (e) ‘Equipment Interference’  
Found in Part 5 of IPA 2016, ‘equipment interference’ is described as a 
‘range of techniques…that may be used to obtain communications, equipment data 
or other information from the equipment.’143  
Equipment data is synonymous with Secondary data, as described in 2.4(a), 
covering both systems data and identifying data.144 There is no indication as to what 
‘other information’ might consist of. The implication is that there is no limit as to 
the types of information/data that can be extracted from ‘equipment’, this Part of the 
Act seems to include all of the previously mentioned data types within its ambit. This 
differs sharply from the provisions described in 2.3 (b) and (c) which requires the 
obtaining of ‘communications’ and ‘communications data’/‘secondary data’ to be 
done through alternate legal avenues. It was my presumption that this was the case 
due to recognizing of the comparative ‘intrusiveness’ of these two different types of 
data. The fact that Part 5 does not seem to divide types of data in this way arguably 
goes to contradict this.  
The definition of ‘equipment’ is extremely broad. Described by section 135 
of the Act as anything producing ‘electromagnetic, acoustic or other emissions’145, 
this essentially goes to include any electronic device that one can feasibly imagine. 
‘Interference’ is stated as including ‘a range of techniques’ that ‘can be carried out 
either remotely or by physically interacting with the equipment.’146 Again, this is 
very broad, but the DRAFT Code provides some helpful examples of equipment 
interference.147 Both examples do not make specific reference to either the Internet 
or networked communications. Prima facie, it may seem as if this method of 
surveillance is not particularly relevant to the thesis topic. Notwithstanding, the 
examples do make reference to the concept of ‘remotely installing’148 surveillance 
software (also dubbed spyware) such as a ‘keylogger’149. The remote installation of 
software on equipment is made possible through the Internet via the Trojan horse 
method mentioned in Chapter 1.4 (e) of this thesis. An email might be sent to the 
target including a file attachment designed with the intention of tricking them into 
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downloading it. The surveillance software is thereby surreptitiously installed onto 
the equipment in question.  
The data obtained through ‘equipment interference’ is not necessarily related 
to one's activity on the Internet or networked communications (although it can in a 
sense). Instead, the Internet is used as a vehicle for obtaining any and all data 
connected with the existence and usage of an electronic device. While key-logging 
software can detect and record everything you type on a keyboard, other types of 
software can just as easily access and record film and audio footage from the 
microphone and camera on your PC or mobile phone.  
 
2.3 (f) ‘Bulk personal datasets’ 
The DRAFT Code notes that ‘ bulk personal dataset’ refers to the practice 
of the Security and Intelligence agencies of collecting ‘information from a variety of 
sources’150 whereby the information collected contained ‘personal data relating to a 
number of individuals.’151 This personal data is then ‘held on electronic systems for 
the purposes of analysis.’152 There is little official information as to what types of 
information constitute ‘personal information’ as well as their potential sources. The 
MI5 provides two examples: the electoral roll, telephone directories or travel related 
data.153 Big Brother Watch, the civil liberties and privacy pressure group, makes the 
addition of driving and vehicle licenses, credit reference agency information, land 
registry information, National Insurance numbers, Oyster card data and passenger 
name records and flight data.154 There does seem to be the implications that ‘bulk 
personal datasets’ are not limited to the records of government agencies but also 
those of private companies, given that ‘passenger name records and flight data’ is 
noted as an example. Given that ‘bulk person datasets’ merely infers the collection 
of personal data, data freely published on websites (such as Facebook) may also be 
subject to a ‘bulk personal dataset’.  
Again, this provision does not strictly relate to the Internet or networked 
communications. That said, a lot of data included in the examples is collected, 
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nowadays, through online forms provided by the government and 3rd party websites. 
A decade ago, one would have had to fill out a paper form in order to apply for a 
driver’s license or utilize telecommunications services etc. Thusly, I would not 
classify this as an example of ‘internet surveillance’ per se. Like ‘equipment 
interference’, it is an example of how the Internet is used to facilitate surveillance 
activities, which would instead constitute the active collection, storage and 
manual/automatic analysis of such information.  
Despite the fact that ‘equipment interference’ and ‘bulk personal datasets’ 
are not types of internet surveillance in a strict sense, it is still important, for the 
purposes of this thesis, to consider them as falling within its ambit. This is due to the 
fact that the existence and usage of the Internet have allowed the government to 
utilize surveillance techniques on a scale and level of intrusiveness never seen 
before. This is to the degree that ‘the internet’ and older forms of surveillance (such 
as reading and analyzing government records of someone) cannot be logically 
separated. In order to see in more detail how the invention of the Internet has affected 
data surveillance, please review Chapter 1.4 (d).   
 
2.3 (g) Targeted and Bulk Powers  
Part 6 of IPA 2016 includes, what are known as, ‘bulk powers’. These 
stipulate that, subject to particular circumstances, security agencies can engage 
intercept communications, acquire communications data and interfere with 
equipment when there is no particular target in mind (the mentioned powers listed in 
Parts 2 – 5 of the Act is conversely referred to as targeted powers). Data is 
acquired/intercepted on a large-scale and may include that of individuals that are of 
no particular interest to the security services. As well as providing for the 
circumstances in which data can be collected in bulk, Part 6 also includes provisions 
on when such data can be selected for examination. Bulk powers differ in terms of 
their geographical scope. Bulk acquisition of communications data cannot be 
imposed on ISPs, ‘…whose equipment is not in or controlled from the UK and who 
do not offer or provide services to persons in the UK.’155. On the other hand, bulk 
equipment interference, is limited to the acquisition of data from overseas and cannot 
be legally used on people ‘…in the British Islands.’156 The same applies to bulk 
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interception, it being legally restricted to ‘communications…sent or received by 
individuals outside the British Islands,’157. 
I have chosen to place ‘bulk personal datasets’ in a separate section (see 
above) because, unlike the other forms of surveillance, there is no targeted 
alternative. The very nature of a ‘bulk personal dataset’ is that data is harvested in 
large quantities, which may then be selected for examination or analysis as part of 
an investigation into an individual/individuals. Data selected for examination from a 
bulk personal dataset must be ‘referable to an individual known to be in the British 
Islands at the time of selection.’158  
 
2.3 (h) Levels of intrusiveness 
As detailed, the IPA 2016 permits the use of a range of surveillance powers. 
The main question for the purposes of this thesis is; to what extent should these 
various powers be considered more or less intrusive? It stands to reason that, the 
more intrusive the power, the stricter the safeguards should be in order to prevent a 
potential breach of privacy rights. This question is fraught with subjectivity. 
Notwithstanding, the DRAFT Codes do provide some limited insight as to how the 
various powers are regarded. The DRAFT Code expressly states that content data 
(the written content of an email for example) is more ‘intrusive’ than 
communications data.159 Moreover, it is also stated that communications data is a 
less broad form of secondary data (the definitions of which can be found above). 
This goes to suggest that powers enabling the acquisition of solely communications 
data are less intrusive than those enabling the acquisition of secondary data (this 
including both communications and other forms of data).  
The DRAFT Codes do not provide commentary on whether bulk powers are 
intrinsically more intrusive than targeted powers. Prima facie, one would suggest 
that bulk powers are more intrusive by virtue of its comparatively indiscriminate 
approach to data collection. Then, again the data is collected in such large 
proportions that it would impossible to analyze it without targeting the specific data 
of interest. Are bulk powers necessarily more intrusive if most of the data is 
discarded without analysis? Another aspect of the comparative intrusiveness of bulk 
and targeted data relates to its geographical scope of application. As stated, all bulk 
powers can only be used overseas except for the ‘bulk acquisition of 
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communications’. In this sense, one could argue that the ‘bulk acquisition of 
communications’ is the least intrusive of the bulk powers; its usage being limited to 
the domestic population of the UK (numbering 65 million) as opposed to the 
population of the rest of the world. Conversely, from the perspective of the domestic 
population of the UK, ‘bulk acquisition of communications’ can be argued to be the 
most intrusive. This serves to highlight the subjective nature of the notion of 
intrusiveness. 
Keeping the idea of intrusiveness in mind, the next chapter will detail the 
provisions of the IPA 2016 that serve to guard against the indiscriminate usage of 
the drafted surveillance powers. I will take a comparative approach, highlighting and 
commenting on how the safeguards vary between the powers and speculating as to 
the reasoning behind it. I will seek to answer the question of whether the relative 
strength of the safeguards have any bearing as to the relative intrusiveness of the 
powers. 
 
2.4 Authorizations, judicial oversights, and safeguards provided for by 
the IPA 2016  
A large proportion of the IPA 2016 consists of provisions limiting the use of 
surveillance powers by the security services and other government bodies. To use 
these powers, one must adhere to strict legal rules and satisfy judicial scrutiny. Once 
data is acquired, its usage is also subject to legislative and judicial safeguards. Acts 
of surveillance initiated outside the IPA 2016’s prescribed mechanisms are without 
‘lawful authority’ and those responsible can be subject to criminal prosecution. The 
penalty for a person found guilty of an offense under the Act is a fine and/or a prison 
sentence (for unlawfully obtaining communications data, one can receive a 12-month 
sentence maximum160).  
Permissions, judicial oversights, and safeguards are the three main methods 
of preventing government bodies from using surveillance powers with impunity and 
having free reign over how the data is then used. They also serve to limit the bodies 
and individuals who are able to access these powers. This is where the IPA 2016 
becomes very complicated.  
My use of the word ‘permission’ refers to the process in which an individual 
or government body must defer to a higher authority when wanting to use a certain 
surveillance power. The higher authority will then grant permission, only if their 
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proposed usage fulfills legislative criteria. This process is referred to by the IPA 2016 
using the terms; warrants, authorizations, and notices. Despite being similar in the 
fact that they all involve the seeking and granting of permission to use a surveillance 
power, they do differ in meaning. I will explain how later in the thesis. 
‘Judicial oversights’ refers to the powers afforded by legislation to an 
impartial judicial body to provide the final say as to whether ‘permission’ to use a 
power should be granted (i.e. the judicial approval of a warrant). This is crucial to 
ensure that such powers are not being used in an indiscriminate or unjust way. It also 
guards against the use of such powers for political means. It is important to analyze 
the extent to which the judiciary is integrated; do they have heavy involvement or 
light involvement? I will go on to look at how they are integrated into the IPA 2016.   
‘Safeguards’ and ‘restrictions’ are general legislative rules that restrain and 
guide the usage of powers after permission has been sought and granted. If an 
individual or government body wishes to act in a way that breaches a safeguard, 
additional permissions may be sought or modifications may be made to the original 
permission. This may or may not require the involvement of a judicial body to 
approve it.  
I will continue by looking at the types of permissions there are in the IPA 
2016 for each power (Interception of communications, equipment inference etc.). As 
stated, these are referred to by the act as; warrants, authorizations, and notices.   
 
2.5 (a) Permissions 
 
2.5 (a)(i) Warrants  
Government usage of ‘interception of communications’, ‘equipment 
interference’ and ‘bulk personal datasets’ is unlawful unless permission has been 
granted by virtue of a warrant (albeit with some exceptions)161. There are numerous 
types of warrants for each power. For IOC there are ‘targeted interception 
warrants’162, ‘bulk interception warrants’163 and ‘targeted examination warrants.’164 
EI warrants are organized in the same way. There are two types of warrants for 
BPDs: the ‘class BPD warrant’ and the ‘specific BPD warrant’.165  
                                                 
161 See. IPA 2016, Part 2, Chapter 12 for exception relating to ‘interception of 
communications’  
162 IPA 2016, Part 2, Section 15(2) 
163 ibid. Section 15(4) 
164 ibid. Section 136  
165 ibid. Part 7, Section 184(3)  
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2.5 (a)(i)(i) IOC warrants  
 
Types of warrant  
‘Targeted interception warrants’ permit the ‘person to whom it is addressed 
to intercept the communications described in the warrant and/or secondary data’166. 
As the name suggests, a ‘bulk interception warrant’ permits the same thing but on a 
bulk scale. The third type of warrant mentioned, the ‘targeted examination warrant’, 
serves as a corollary to the ‘bulk interception warrant’, it authorizing the selection of 
data obtained through ‘bulk interception’ for examination.  
 
Who can apply?  
The persons who can apply for ‘targeted interception warrants’ are listed in 
Part 2, Section 18(1) and generally include the most senior members of internal 
security and law enforcement (i.e. The Director General of the Security Service). 
These number nine in all. The only persons who do not strictly fit this remit are ‘the 
Commissioners for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs’ (HMRC).  The HMRC’s 
main responsibilities are to administer the collection of tax and distribute social 
security payments. That said, the body is also involved in the prevention of crime, 
producing regulations relating to the prevention of money laundering. 167  The 
numbers of authorities that can apply for a ‘bulk interception warrant’ are severely 
reduced, it being restricted to the three most senior people of the security services. 
 
The subject matter of warrants; thematic or non-thematic 
‘Targeted warrants’ (‘targeted interception warrants’ and ‘targeted 
examination warrants’) must be drafted so as to ‘specify or describe the factors used 
for identifying the communications to be intercepted or selection for examination.’168 
This includes ‘addresses, numbers, apparatus, other factors’ or a combination 
thereof.169 Any factor specified must identify communications which ‘are likely to 
be or include – (a) communications from, or intended for, any person or organization 
                                                 
166 Op.cit. ‘DRAFT Code of Practice; Interception of Communications’, pp.14, §4.5   
167 HM Revenue and Customs, ‘Money laundering supervision: introduction’, 23 October 
2014 (https://www.gov.uk/guidance/money-laundering-regulations-introduction)  
168 Op.cit. ‘DRAFT Code of Practice; Interception of Communications’, pp.20, §5.4 
169 Op.cit. IPA 2016, Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 31, §8(b)  
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named or described in the warrant, or (b) communications originating or, or intended 
for transmission to, any premises named or described in the warrant.’170 
The three entities described in Section 31 – person, organization, and 
premises (the definitions of which can be found in Schedule 1 to the Interpretation 
Act 1978) – can be described by the warrant individually (i.e. Osama Bin Laden). 
Alternatively, the warrant can be drafted in such a way that encompasses numerous 
people, organizations, and premises in accordance with a specific ‘theme’. An 
example of a ‘theme’ would be ‘a group who shares a common purpose’171 There 
must be a full and thorough description of the ‘theme’ as well as a list of every 
person/organization/premises that might be encompassed within it, as reasonably 
practicable. In cases where it is deemed not ‘reasonably practicable’ to describe in 
further detail, written justification must be provided.172 These have been termed 
‘thematic’ and ‘non-thematic warrants’. ‘Bulk interception warrants’, conversely, 
are not required to name a person organization or set of premises – data being 
collected indiscriminately and en mass. Specificity is instead covered by the 
targeted-examination warrant, which is required to examine bulk data.  
 
 
Format  
An application for targeted-interception and targeted-examination warrants 
must be drafted in a specific format. The format - detailed by pages 30 and 31 of the 
DRAFT Code of Interception of Communications – consists of around 18 points, 
which go towards ensuring that the legal, operational and formal ramifications have 
been fully considered by the applicant before its submission. Points (a) of both types 
of warrant require the applicant to include information on: 
…The statutory ground(s) on which the warrant is sought is considered 
necessary. Any application for a warrant in the interests of the economic well-being 
of the UK should identify how those interests are also relevant to the interests of 
national security…  
Bulk interception warrants must also be formatted in a specific way, the 
details of which are covered by the aforementioned DRAFT code on page 56.  
 
Authorization  
                                                 
170 ibid. §9 (a) and (b)  
171 ibid. Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 17, §2  
172 Op.cit. ‘DRAFT Code of Practice; Interception of Communications’, pp.25, §5.15  
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Once any type of warrant application has been made by – or on behalf of - 
one of the listed authorities, it must be presented to the Secretary of State for 
consideration. It is the Secretary of State who has the power to either authorize or 
reject an application at first instance. Authorization can only be granted if the 
Secretary of State is satisfied that ‘…necessary for a legitimate purpose and 
proportionate to that purpose.’173 This is otherwise referred to as ‘necessity’. For 
targeted interception, ‘legitimate purposes’ include (a) the ‘interests of national 
security’174 (b) for ‘the purposes of preventing or detecting serious crime’175 or (c) 
‘in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom’ as long as they 
are related to ‘interests of national security.’176 The latter purpose is only considered 
‘legitimate’ if the data to be retrieved relates to ‘acts or intentions of persons outside 
the British Islands’177, thereby prohibiting the domestic use of interception in such 
circumstances.  
Whereas for targeted interception warrants it is sufficient for the legitimate 
aim to be (a), (b) or (c), bulk interception warrants and targeted examination warrants 
must always have (a) - national security - at its core.178 The reason for this relates to 
the fact that the warrants can only be used to retrieve and examine exterritorial 
communications. Indeed, to prevent or detect serious crime in another country would 
be beyond the remit of the UK’s Security Services. 
One a ‘legitimate purpose’ has been identified; The Secretary of State must 
then apply the test of ‘proportionality’ to the proposed conduct. As stated by the 
DRAFT code, ‘any assessment of proportionality involves balancing the seriousness 
of the intrusion into the privacy…against the need for the activity…’179 to bring 
about a ‘realistic prospect’ of achieving its purpose. The conduct would be 
disproportionate/arbitrary if the same outcome could be achieved through a less 
intrusive means (i.e. intercepting secondary data instead of communications). The 
Secretary of State must also consider is to what extent the proposed conduct serves/is 
a detriment to the ‘public interest’. Compliance with Human Rights180, the ‘integrity 
and security of telecommunications systems’181 and the ‘sensitivity’182 of the data in 
                                                 
173 ibid. pp.16, §4.10  
174 IPA 2016, Part 2, Chapter 1, Section 20, §2(a)  
175 ibid. §2(b)  
176 ibid. §2(c)  
177 ibid. §4 
178 ibid. Part 6, Chapter 1, Section 138, §1(b)(i)   
179 Op.cit. ‘DRAFT Code; Interception of Communications’, pp.17, §4.12 
180 IPA 2016, Part 1, §4(d) 
181 ibid. §2(c) 
182 ibid. §2(b) 
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question are noted as being related to this. Other guidelines related to the application 
of the test are published in IPA 2016, Part 1, §2(2). Concerning thematic warrants, 
The Secretary of State must be satisfied that the ‘theme’ has been adequately fleshed-
out so as to fulfill the requirements of Section 31. 
 
2.5(a)(i)(ii) EI warrants  
 
Types of warrant  
There are three types of EI warrant; 1) targeted-equipment interference 
warrants 2) targeted-examination warrants and 3) bulk-equipment interference 
warrants. Listed in sections 99(1), 99(2) and 99(9) respectively, these warrants are 
barely distinguishable from their IOC counterparts (see above for a full description). 
Indeed, the only functional difference between IOC and EI warrants lies in the 
surveillance methods they permit. One cannot perform acts of interception with an 
EI warrant, despite the fact that the types of data that might be obtained through such 
methods could be the same (communications and secondary data – including 
equipment data). EI and IOC are distinct acts and must be considered separately.  
One notable difference between the law applicable to EI and IOC lies in the 
fact that it is not mandatory for the security services to obtain equipment interference 
warrants in cases when a) a CMA (Computer Misuse Act 1990) offense would not 
be committed b) there is no British Islands connection.183 Notwithstanding, if the 
Security Services are able to obtain a warrant, it is recommended that they do.184  
 
Who can apply?  
The number of officials who can apply for a targeted equipment interference 
warrant is more than double the number of officials who can apply for a targeted 
interception of communications warrant. Not only does it include the most senior 
officials of the Security Services and law enforcement, it also lists the most senior 
officials of the military police, senior immigration and customs officials (if 
specifically designated by the Secretary of State), senior officials of the HMRC (if 
specifically designated by the HMRC), the chair of the Competitions and Markets 
Authority and the most senior officials of the bodies responsible for reviews, 
investigations and complaints into the Police.185 
                                                 
183 Op.cit. ‘DRAFT Code; Equipment Interference’, pp.17, §3.31 
184 ibid. pp.15, §3.25  
185 Op.cit. IPA 2016, Part 5, Sections 102, 104 & 106 
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Like the IOC, the number of people who are able to apply for a targeted 
equipment examination warrant and a bulk equipment interference warrant is 
drastically reduced, they being limited to the most senior members of the Security 
Services (i.e. the Director of the GCHQ).186 
Unlike with IOC, the Secretary of State is not the only issuing authority in 
the case of targeted equipment interference warrants and targeted examination 
warrants. In cases where an application is made by an ‘appropriate law enforcement 
officer’ of the listed ‘law enforcement agencies’, warrants can be considered and 
issued by a ‘law enforcement chief.’187   
 
The subject matter of warrants; thematic or non-thematic 
Like with IOC, targeted equipment interference warrants and targeted 
examination warrants can either be thematic or non-thematic in nature and largely 
takes on the same form. Non-thematic warrants will target particular pieces of 
equipment that belongs to, is used by or in the possession of a particular person or 
organization. It can also be used to target a piece of equipment in a specific 
location.188  In cases where there is an interest in multiple pieces of equipment, it is 
necessary to define the theme that links them (i.e. there is a common purpose or 
shared activity between the people that the equipment belongs to).189 Like with IOCs, 
the theme must be fully fleshed-out and there must be specificity as to the target 
where ‘reasonably practicable’.190 
 
Format  
EI warrant applications (targeted, bulk and targeted examination) to be valid, 
must be drafted in strict accordance with the numerous stipulated formats. These are 
outlined on pages 37 – 45 of the DRAFT Code. These ensure that the specific details 
and ‘themes’ of the applications are adequately ‘fleshed out’ and that ramifications 
concerning ‘legitimate aim’ and ‘proportionality’ have been explored. The 
formatting also ensures that the applications are being made by/on behalf of an 
authority who had the right to do so.  
 
Authority  
                                                 
186 Op.cit. ‘DRAFT Code; Equipment Interference’, pp.22, §4.6  
187 ibid. pp.28, §5.6 
188 ibid. pp.29, §5.8 
189 ibid. pp.31, §5.12  
190 ibid. pp.32, §5.15  
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The Secretary of State (and, in certain cases, a chief law enforcement 
officer), before issuing a warrant, must consider whether the planned course of action 
has a ‘legitimate aim’ and fulfills the doctrine of ‘proportionality’. This is conducted 
in much the same way for all types of warrant (See above. For further detail).  
 
2.5(a) (i) (iii) Bulk Personal Datasets  
 
Types of warrant  
There are two types of BPD warrant available under the IPA 2016; (a) ‘class 
BPD warrant’ and (b) ‘specific BPD warrant’. 191  Whereas the former warrant 
permits the applying authority to retain and/or examine any PD (personal dataset) 
falling within a specific ‘class’ (i.e. travel dataset), the latter type of warrant will be 
utilized where the PD sought does not fall – or easily fit - into a particular ‘class’ of 
BPD. Given that most PDs do fit into a ‘class’ of BPD, a specific warrant will only 
be applied for in rare cases.  Other reasons for applying for a specific BPD might 
include the associated political ramifications of retaining and examining the dataset 
in question, as well other consideration.192  
As highlighted by my use of and/or, warrants of either kind can permit the 
applicant to either retain a PD or retain and examine a PD. Where an applicant is 
permitted only to retain a PD, he cannot also examine that data without modifying 
or applying for a new warrant.  
It is possible to obtain BPDs through other types of warrants. In these cases, 
the stipulations of Part 7 do not apply. A BPD, for example, might be obtained 
through acts of bulk/targeted interception of communications or equipment 
interference (either on purpose or inadvertently). An example provided by the 
DRAFT code is; ‘where an email had been intercepted and a BPD was attached to 
the email’.193  
 
Who can apply?  
Class and specific BPD warrants can be only made by – or on behalf of – 
the most senior members of the security services.  
 
The subject matter of warrants; Class and specific BPD warrants  
                                                 
191 Op.cit IPA 2016, Part 7, Section 204 - 205 
192 Op.cit. ‘DRAFT Code of Practice;…Retention and Use of Bulk Personal Datasets’, 
pp14, §4.23 
193 ibid. pp.12, §4.11 
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In terms of class datasets, the applying authority is not free to retain or 
examine datasets of any class of their choosing.  Section 202 of the IPA 2016 restricts 
the choice of certain class datasets if the: 
Head of intelligence considers that: (a) the BPD consists of, or includes, 
protected data; (b) the BPD consists of, or includes, health records; (c) a substantial 
proportion of the BPD consists of sensitive personal data; or (d) the nature of the 
BPD, or the circumstances in which it was created, raises novel or contentious 
issues…194  
  These ‘novel or contentious issues’ must be considered before the 
Secretary of State before the warrant can progress.  
  ‘Health records’ are self-explanatory although further detail can be 
found in Section 206(6) of the IPA 2016. ‘Protected data’ refers to identifying data 
and systems data, both of which have been described earlier in the thesis. ‘Sensitive 
personal data’ refers to such forms of data ‘consisting of information as to – (a) the 
racial or ethnic origin of the data subject (b) his political opinions (c) his religious 
beliefs…’ etc.195  
  This rule also applies if the BPDs contains confidential information 
relating to members of a ‘sensitive profession’. Sensitive professions are outlined as 
‘lawyers, doctors and journalists’ and confidential information would include such 
things as correspondence between the professional and their client.196  
 Where such circumstances materialize, the applying authority must 
instead opt for a ‘specific warrant’.  
 
Format  
Like with other types of warrant, the class BPD warrant must elicit the type of 
data to be found which – in this case – necessitates a description of the BPD and a 
description of what ‘class’ the BPD can be categorized as. It must also include an 
assessment as to any privacy risks (E.g. Does the BPD contain any confidential 
information relating to a sensitive profession?) and whether the level of intrusion is 
necessary/proportional.  
 Where a specific warrant is concerned, the warrant must go into 
further detail into the ‘nature and scope of the BPD’197, given the fact that the 
applicant cannot make reference to a specific ‘class’. The applicant, must however 
                                                 
194 ibid. 
195 Data Protection Act 1998, Part 1, Section 2 (a) – (c) 
196 Op.cit. DRAFT Code; ..Retention and Use of BPD, pp.13, §4.14 – 4.17  
197 ibid. pp.19  
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also make efforts to explain as to what type of categories, if any, the BPD in question 
can fit into. Given that specific warrants will often be applied for on the basis that 
the BPD will contain sensitive information or protected data, the warrant will need 
to contain a description of the ‘nature and extent’ of such data198 as well as to what 
the source pertains (e-mails, letters etc.)  
 
Authority  
BPD warrants can only be issued by the Secretary of State. As per usual, he 
is required to apply the doctrine of necessity and proportionality (See. Above) and 
only permits the acquisition, examination, and retention of BPDs where the same 
aim cannot be accomplished through a less intrusive means.  
 
2.5(a)(ii) Authorizations  
There is one surveillance power under the IPA 2016 whose permission is 
termed an ‘authorization’ instead of a ‘warrant’, listed in Part 3 as ‘authorizations 
for obtaining communications data’. That said, I will also be considering another 
type of ‘warrant’ under this section. This is by virtue of the fact that only permissions 
for the targeted obtaining of communications data are termed as authorizations. Bulk 
acquisitions (the power to obtain communications data in bulk), on the other hand, 
are referred to as warrants. This is found in Part 6 Chapter 2 of the IPA 2016. Instead 
of examining this power in the ‘warrant’ section above, for the sake of clarity, I feel 
it is best to keep targeted and bulk powers of the same variety - the obtaining and 
examining of communications data - together.   
 
2.5(a)(ii)(i) Authorizations for obtaining communications data  
 
Types of authorizations 
There is only one type of ‘authorization’ and it grants permission for an 
individual to acquire/obtain communications data. Authorizations do not permit acts 
of ‘equipment interference’ or ‘interception’. Neither should it be used where the 
data in question is unlikely to constitute ‘communications data’.199  As said, an 
‘authorization’ merely gives permission for the applicant to compel an ISP to provide 
the desired data. As such, it usually requires the ISPs active cooperation. That said, 
                                                 
198 ibid. 
199 Home Office, ‘DRAFT Code; Communications Data’, Autumn 2016, pp.25, §5.6, 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/557862/IP_
Bill_-_Draft_CD_code_of _practice.pdf) 
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where the ISP is ‘not capable of obtaining or disclosing the communications data’, 
the applicant may still be able to acquire it so long as their actions in doing so cannot 
be classified as ‘interception’ or ‘interference’.200  
  
Who can apply?  
A ‘member of the public authority’201 can apply for an authorization. The 
member in question (hereby referred to as ‘the applicant’) must be a person ‘involved 
in conducting an investigation for a relevant public authority.’ 202 
 The Act’s interpretation of ‘public authority’ is comparatively expansive 
and includes a large number of government agencies that cannot be said to constitute 
either the police or security services. Some examples are The Department of Health, 
the HMRC, the Department for Transport, the Department for Work and Pensions, 
The Financial Conduct Authority, the Food Standards Agency, the Gambling 
Commission and numerous others.203 In comparison to the surveillance powers that 
I have already covered in this section (Interception of Communications, Bulk Person 
Datasets etc.), many more agencies have been permitted access to this particular 
power under the Act. As to why this is the case, I will discuss later in the thesis.  
As far as can be taken from the words of the Act and the relevant DRAFT 
Code,  ‘a member’ refers to anyone working within the organizations listed in 
Schedule 4 and makes no reference to the seniority or the level of authority that the 
applicant must possess.  
 
The subject matter of authorizations 
Applications must describe the ‘communications data required’ which 
includes whether the data in question ‘relates to a victim, a witness, a complainant, 
a suspect, next of kin, vulnerable person or other person relevant to the investigation 
or operation.’204 The applicant must also specify the dates (past or future) or time 
periods from which he wishes to obtain communications data 205  (i.e. all 
communications data relating to the witness from 1st Jan 2018 – 1st Feb 2018). The 
Act does not differentiate between thematic or non-thematic authorizations, as 
mentioned before. Indeed, the level of ‘specificity’ required in applications for 
                                                 
200 ibid. pp.34, §50  
201 ibid. pp.25, §4.2  
202 ibid. pp.26, §4.7  
203 Op.cit IPA 2016, Schedule 4, Part 1  
204 Op.cit. ‘DRAFT Code of Practice; Communications Data’, pp.26, §4.9  
205 ibid. 
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authorizations seems to be much lower than that of warrants. That said, whether the 
application is indeed too broad and unspecific is something that will be judged in the 
application of the test of proportionality.  
 
Format 
Applications must typically be submitted in a hand-written or electronic 
form. Applications can also be made orally in urgent circumstances (something that 
I will look a later). 206  A description of the communications data required, as 
mentioned above, must be provided. It must also include a full explanation of why 
the acquirement of data listed should be considered ‘necessary and proportionate to 
what is sought to be achieved…’ and a consideration of any ‘unintended 
consequences’.207 A final consideration is whether the ISP subject to the application 
is permitted to inform the customer that their data is in the course of being acquired 
by the government.208  
 
Authority  
Unlike warrants, authorizations are not required to be issued by the Secretary 
of State. Instead, they can be issued by a ‘designated senior officer’. Those 
individuals that can be considered a ‘designated senior officer’ for the purposes of 
issuing an authorization are found in Schedule 4 of the IPA 2016. They typically 
occupy the most senior position of their respective ‘public authority’ (i.e. The Senior 
Manager of the Gambling Commission). For some government agencies, the second-
highest ranking individual can also grant authorizations such as the Inspector of the 
Metropolitan police force – the Superintendent is the highest ranking.  
Like warrants, authorizations may be granted if the ‘designated senior 
officer’ deems the proposed action to be a proportionate response to a legitimate aim 
(the tests of ‘proportionality’ and ‘necessity’). The list of legitimate aims – found in 
section 61 of the Act - include the same as those relating to warrants: 7(a) the 
‘interests of national security’, 7(b) for ‘the purposes of preventing or detecting 
serious crime’ and 7(c) ‘in the interests of the economic well-being of the United 
Kingdom’ as long as they are related to ‘interests of national security.’ That said, 
there are some additional aims that have not been drafted in relation to warrants such 
as: 7(d) in the ‘interests of public safety’ 7(e) ‘for the purpose of protecting public 
                                                 
206 ibid. pp.26, §4.7  
207 ibid. §4.9  
208 ibid.  
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health’ and 7(f) ‘for the purposes of preventing death or injury or any damage to a 
person’s physical or mental health.’ The list of ‘legitimate aims’ number ten in all.  
One can see a clear link between the drafting of these additional legitimate 
aims and the drafting of additional government agencies in Schedule 4, who are 
capable of applying for/granting an authorization. For example, the ‘purpose of 
protecting public health’ would be an aim of particular relevance to the remit of The 
Department of Health. 
Pursuant to Schedule 4, certain designated senior officers are limited in their 
power to grant authorizations. The limitations vary according to the specific agency 
and position of the designated senior officer and are related to the aforementioned 
‘aims’ listed in Section 61. For example, the Inspector of the Metropolitan Police 
Force is able to grant authorizations as long as they purport to fulfill any of the 
Section 61 aims (7(a) – (j)). The Senior Manager of the Gambling Commission, on 
the other hand, can only grant authorizations so long as the application only purports 
to fulfill aim 7(b) of Section 61 which is: ‘for the purpose of preventing or detecting 
crime or of preventing disorder.’ It is evident that this has been drafted so as to 
prevent the agencies from overstepping their operational remit.  
Furthermore, a designated senior officer may also be prohibited from 
granting authorization where they concern the acquisition of a certain form of data. 
According to Schedule 7, the Inspector of the City of London Police force may only 
grant authorizations where it concerns ‘entity data’ (as a type of ‘communications 
data’) specifically. The Superintendent, on the other hand, may grant authorizations 
for all forms of data.  
 
2.5(a)(ii)(ii) Bulk acquisition warrants (communications data) 
Bulk Acquisition warrants operate in much the same way as the bulk 
warrants considered above, including the way in which they can only be used to 
acquire data concerning targets who are outside the British Isles. The warrants can 
only be used to acquire communications data and any action that is considered 
interception or interference under the Act must only be done in accordance with a 
Bulk interception/interference warrant. Only the most senior members of the security 
services can apply for the warrant, with the warrant being issued by the Secretary of 
State after applications of the tests of legitimate aim and proportionality (See. Home 
Office, DRAFT Code of Practice; Bulk acquisition of Communications Data, 
December 2016 and section 2.5(a)(ii) – 2.5(a)(iii) of this thesis).  
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2.5(a)(iii) Notices  
‘Notices’ functionally differ from authorizations and warrants. Whereas 
warrants and authorization grants permission to the applicant to engage in certain 
acts (i.e. interception of communications) in order to acquire certain forms of data 
(i.e. systems data) and fulfil a predetermined aim, notices are served to ISPs in order 
to compel their cooperation with an investigation and may require them to take 
certain actions. Due to the nature of notices, they only apply to those ‘who offer or 
provide a telecommunications service to persons in the UK or provides a 
telecommunications system which is (wholly or in part) in or controlled from the 
UK.’209 
Notices cannot be used in situations that would require a warrant or an 
authorization such as the interception of communications data.  
 
Types of notice 
There are four types of ‘notice’ provided for by the Act. The first relates to 
the acquisition of communications data discussed above and is covered by Part 3, 
Sections 64 – 65 of the Act. These are used in conjunction with authorizations in 
order acquire communications data. Where an authorization has been granted to a 
member of the public authority to acquire certain communications data, it may be 
necessary to serve an ISP with a notice in order to facilitate the acquisition. In many 
cases, the ISPs will already possess the communications data in question. Where 
they do not have the data, they will certainly have the capabilities to acquire it on 
behalf of the public authority.  
The second type are known as ‘retention notices’ and are contained in Part 
4 of the Act. These are issued by the Secretary of State to ‘a particular operator or 
any description of operators’ and can require that operator to retain all or some 
communications data of a certain description for a certain time period, not exceeding 
12 months. 210 These are also used in conjunction with the acquisition of 
communications data.  
The third is termed a ‘National Security Notice’ which is covered by Part 9, 
Sections 249, 252, 254 and 258 of the Act. This allows the ‘Secretary of State to give 
a notice to a telecommunications operator in the UK requiring the taking of specified 
                                                 
209 Home Office, ‘DRAFT Code of Practice; National Security Notices’, December 2017, 
pp.3, §2.4, 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/668939/Dra
ft_code_-_National_Security_Notices.pdf) _ 
210 IPA 2016, Part 4, Section 87 (2)(a) – (c) 
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steps’ that he/she ‘considers necessary in the interests of national security.’ What 
‘specified steps’ means is not strictly stipulated, although some vague examples are 
provided by the DRAFT Code such as: ‘to carry out any conduct for the purpose of 
facilitating done by an intelligence service; to carry out any conduct for the purpose 
of dealing with an emergency’ etc. 
The fourth is known as a ‘Technical capability Notice’ and is found in Part 
9, Section 253. It is similar to a ‘National Security notice’ and is issued where ‘the 
Secretary of State considers that the notice is necessary for securing that the operator 
has the capability to provide any assistance which the operator may be required to 
provide in relation to any relevant authorization.’(IPA 2016, Part9, Chapter 1, 
Section 253).  
For the purposes of this thesis, I will be focusing on notices in relation to 
‘authorizations’ as well as ‘data retention notices’. This is due to the fact that they 
are the only types of notice that have direct implications for the data – more 
specifically, the communications data - of private citizens. ‘Technical capability 
notices’ and ‘national security notices’ require ISPs to act in accordance with the 
directions of the Secretary of State, but makes no reference to data per se.  
 
Who can apply?  
In relation to acquiring communications data through authorizations – 
considered above – a ‘member of the public authority’ can apply for the issuing of a 
notice as part and parcel of an application for an authorization. The list of ‘public 
authorities’ or who are eligible to make an application are listed in Schedule 4 of the 
Act.  
For ‘retention notices’, it is stated that ‘key operational agencies (including 
law enforcement agencies and security and intelligence agencies) maintain 
governance arrangements in order to identify operational requirements, including the 
potential requirement to issue a data retention notice.’211 As such, applications are 
not made by a government agency in the traditional sense. Government agencies – 
as stated - merely ‘identify an operational requirement’ for communications data to 
be retained by the ISP. This requirement is then noted by the Home Office who, in 
collaboration with the ISPs and the Secretary of State, take more formal steps 
towards the drafting and issuing of the notice.  
 
                                                 
211 Op.cit, ‘DRAFT Code; Communications Data’, pp.84, §14.1  
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The subject matter/format of notices and authority to issue 
I have decided to combine the above stages, given that the process for 
issuing an ‘authorization’ notice and a retention notice are not as clearly/formally 
defined or extensive. 
 To issue an ISP with a retention notice, there is no formal applications 
process that must occur beforehand. It is merely up to the discretion of the Secretary 
of State (and the Home Office), after taking into account numerous factors and 
considering it as necessary and proportional to do so. This will include a period in 
which the Home Office and the Secretary of State will directly engage with ISPs that 
might be affected. Concerns, technical issues as well as what the ISP will be required 
to do if a retention notice is issued will be discussed. Throughout these discussions, 
the Secretary of State is required to bear in mind; ‘the size of the CSP…the speed of 
growth of the CSP…whether the CSP operates a niche service.’ Etc.212 It will help 
him/her come to a decision on the question of ‘necessity’. Factors that the Secretary 
of State will have to take into account when considering ‘proportionality’ must 
include such things as: ‘The likely benefit of the notice – the extent to which the data 
to be retained may be of use to the public authorities…The likely number of users of 
the services to be covered by the notice – this will help the Secretary of State to 
consider...the level of intrusion on customers.’213 The DRAFT Code lists several 
other issues for consideration. The ‘retention notice’ may be issued if the Secretary 
of State is satisfied that it is ‘necessary and proportional.’  
Where a ‘member of the public authority’ seeks a notice in order to acquire 
specific communications data, once a designated senior officer has provided an 
‘authorization to acquire communications data’ – outlined above  – he must then 
draft the notice and then serve it to the relevant ISP. The notice must be drafted in a 
specific fashion and include the information listed in §4.71, pp. 37 of the DRAFT 
Code; Communications Data, which includes such things as a description of ‘the 
communications data to be obtained or disclosed…’ a specification of ‘the 
requirements being imposed and the telecommunications operator on whom the 
requirements are being imposed…’ and ‘an indication of any urgency or time within 
which the CSP (ISP) is requested to comply with the requirements of the notice…’, 
among others.  
 
2.5(b) Judicial Oversights  
                                                 
212 ibid. pp.84, §14.3  
213 ibid. pp.86, §14.17  
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The IPA 2016 prevents the politicization of surveillance powers through the 
integration of ‘independent’ judicial bodies. The degree of their representation is not 
consistent throughout the Act and they vary in their role from surveillance power to 
surveillance power. This will be the focus of the section.  
According to the IPA 2016, there are two judicial bodies of whom serve to 
mediate the government’s use of the surveillance powers contained; the Judicial 
Commission (JC) and the Investigatory Powers Commission (IPC). Unlike the 
former, the latter body is composed of just one individual.  
It is the duty of the Prime Minister to appoint people to these positions albeit 
– in the case of the IPC - with the ‘joint recommendation from the Lord Chief Justice 
of England and Wales, the Lord President of Scotland, the Lord Chief Justice of 
Northern Ireland and the Lord Chancellor’214. No-one may be appointed as the IPC 
or as a member of the JC unless they have held a judicial position to the equivalent 
seniority of a High Court judge.’215  
The JC and IPC must ensure that the government’s usage of the IPA 2016’s 
surveillance powers are necessary and proportional, and can refuse approval if not. 
The Act makes clear that this function requires an application of ‘the same principles 
that a court would apply on an application for Judicial Review.’216 This makes sense, 
given that, what the JCs and IPCs are essentially deciding on whether the powers are 
being utilized ultra vires. The principles themselves are the culmination of hundreds 
of years’ worth of common law jurisprudence, and it is beyond the scope of this 
thesis to go into them in any great detail.  
The JCs and the IC are provided with all the assistance and documentation 
that they may need to perform their job effectively, including access to the technical 
systems involved.217 
 
Warrants 
After a warrant has been issued by the Secretary of State (this includes all 
bulk/targeted warrants under the IPA 2016), the warrant must receive the approval 
of the ‘Judicial Commissioners’ (JCs).  
The ‘Judicial Commissioners’ must conduct a thorough review of the 
warrant with respect to the test of necessity and proportionality. In the event that the 
warrant is rejected by the JCs, the applying agency may re-draft the application in 
                                                 
214 ibid.  
215 Op.cit. ‘Explanatory Notes’, §107, pp.23  
216 ibid. pp.20., §84  
217 Op.cit. IPA 2016, Part 8, Chapter 1, Section 235  
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line with the JCs recommendations, whereby the Secretary of State can resubmit. An 
alternative avenue is to appeal the decision to the IPC, who will then consider the 
warrant along the same lines. In the event of another rejection, there are no further 
avenues for appeal, with the warrant remaining invalid.  
 
Authorizations 
Authorizations granted by a designated senior officer of a public authority 
to acquire communications data218, neither require the approval of the JC nor the 
IPC. Instead, the authorization need only receive approval from the ‘relevant judicial 
authority.’219 The ‘relevant judicial authority’ is taken by the Act to mean ‘a justice 
of the peace’220. Unlike with warrants, authorizations not require approval from a 
senior judge. Instead, any judge is able to approve an authorization. Where the 
‘justice of peace’ believes that the authorization fails to fulfill the standards necessity 
and proportionality, he/she can make ‘an order quashing the authorization.’221 
 
Notices 
Retention Notices must be reviewed by the JC and the IPC in much the same 
way as warrants.222  
Given that the authorization for acquiring communications data has been 
approved by a ‘justice of the peace’ (See. Above), a notice that is drafted by the 
senior designated officer in order to give effect to the authorization need not acquire 
any additional judicial approval before it can have an effect.223 
 
2.5(c) Restrictions and Safeguards  
Thus far, I have described how the IPA 2016 restricts the unbridled usage of 
the surveillance powers contained through a ‘permission’ system (in the form of a 
warrant, authorization or notice) and through allowing for judicial oversight. These 
are the hurdles the government must jump before acts of interception or equipment 
interference etc. can legally be committed. Notwithstanding, the government is still 
restricted in terms of what they are able to do and how long they are able to do it, 
                                                 
218 See. IPA 2016, Part 3, Section 75  
219 ibid. IPA 2016, Part 3, Section 75(7)  
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during and after the power has been granted. This is by virtue of a number of 
provisions, which I am terming as ‘restrictions’ and ‘safeguards.’ 
By ‘restrictions’, I am referring to the warrant/authorization/notice itself and 
the IPA 2016 provisions related to their duration, cancellation, renewal, and 
modification. Once a permission is issued, its integrity is protected and the 
government must fulfill the additional requirement in order to change it. I am using 
the term ‘safeguards’ in the same way as the IPA 2016, this referring to provisions 
affect the government ability to retain and disclose data that has been acquired 
through a surveillance power, as well as its destruction.  
With reference to ‘restrictions’, the IPA 2016 treats the modification or 
renewal of an existing warrant/authorization/notice as if it was being newly created. 
In the case of warrants, the Secretary of State possessed the power of modifying or 
renewing warrants, this being overseen by the JC and the IC. At every stage, the test 
of necessity and proportionality must be applied. Where these tests are not satisfied, 
the modification will be denied or the warrant will be canceled.  
Warrants/authorizations/notices are only valid for a certain duration, after which, 
they must be renewed. Where there is no renewal, they are automatically canceled.  
 Concerning ‘safeguards’, the government is restricted to using the 
data obtained in a way that is necessary and proportional. Such safeguards affect; 
‘the number of persons to whom the material is disclosed…the extent to which the 
material is copied…the number of copies that are made’ Etc. Ergo. The government 
can only produce 100 copies of the material obtained if it is considered necessary 
and proportionate. 
The restrictions and safeguards drafted in the IPA 2016 are subject to high 
degrees of nuance between the powers and delineating all the differences would be 
beyond the scope of this thesis. I believe that it is merely important to note their 
existence as well as the fact that the test of ‘necessity and proportionality’ is woven 
into the fabric of the Act, consistently mediating the usage of the powers contained.  
 
2.5 (d) Overview of Chapter 2.5  
The IPA 2016 is a piece of legislation that is over three-hundred pages long, 
replete with long, complicated lists of provisions and jargon. The purpose of this 
section was to provide a brief overview of the Act, that serves to highlight the ways 
in which it legislates for and responds to alternate surveillance powers with – 
arguably – alternate levels of ‘intrusiveness.’  In doing so, I attempted to avoid being 
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inundated with the technicalities so as to provide a clear and concise context for the 
following sections. I urge you to find and inspect Act itself for further information.  
I will continue by providing a commentary on the Act’s provisions, 
including further discussion on whether the Act attempts to account for varying 
levels of intrusiveness via a sensitive and nuanced approach/applications of the 
permissions procedures, judicial oversights and restrictions/safeguards.  
.  
2.6 Commentary   
 
The problem of thematic warrants  
‘Thematic warrants’ featured in relation to ‘equipment interference 
warrants’, this being something that has received a relatively large degree of public 
attention and disapproval. Criticisms concern the fact that ‘thematic warrants’ seem 
not negate the requirement to identify ‘each target of the surveillance to be identified 
in the warrant.’224 Its opponents deem it to be far too general and ill-defined, possibly 
leading to abuse. It has been highlighted, in arguments to this effect, that there are 
no provisions requiring that individuals or premises be subject to a degree of 
‘suspicion’ as to their involvement in criminal (or other activities) before they can 
be caught by the warrant. 225  It merely requires there to be a past or present 
‘connection’, something which I detailed in the section on ‘equipment interference 
warrants’, on page 33.  
The advocacy group Liberty, states that its open-ended nature could 
result in ‘wide-sweeping powers’ interfering with the rights of ‘hundreds or 
thousands of people’ in the course of a single investigation226. It is curious why 
‘thematic warrants’ only formed part of equipment interference and not interception 
of communications.  
 
Lack of Judicial oversight for warrants (The JCs and the IPC)  
Another aspect of the IPA 2016 that has been subject to criticism is 
the supposed lack of judicial oversight in regard to the application and issuing of 
warrants. This was something that numerous Parliamentarians commented upon in 
                                                 
224 Camilla Graham Wood, Thematic warrants: ‘Destroying democracy under the cloak of 
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the debates preceding the draft Bill227. It was also an argument put forward by Tom 
Hickman QC, co-opting the words of Lord Mansfield in the old case Leah v. 
Money228: “It is not fit that the receiving or judging of the information should be left 
to the discretion of the officer. The magistrate ought to judge.”  
It is indeed true that the power to issue warrants does lie with a 
member of the government, namely the Secretary of State, to which he must apply 
the tests of necessity and proportionality. Given this fact, it is obvious why there is 
concern over judicial oversight, given that it is imperative to the rule of law that such 
interferences of the rights of the individual should be mixed up with political 
considerations. The value of these criticisms is lessened, however, when one 
considers the safeguards put in place. A central part of the IPA 2016’s warrant 
system is that the warrant is subsequently authorized by the JCs. As noted in Chapter 
2.1(4)(a) of this thesis, the JC can only be composed of those who have held a judicial 
position at least as senior as a high court judge. The JCs are also required to apply 
the test of necessity and proportionality in their consideration of the warrant and treat 
the court procedure as if it were an instance of judicial review. Moreover, there is an 
appeal process resembling standard court procedure, the Secretary of State then 
being able to take the warrant to the IPC. This certainly seems to suggest a strong 
‘judicial oversight’, contrary to the criticism levied against it. Of course, the judiciary 
can never be completely free from politics. Similar to the manner in which the 
highest court officials are selected, the JC and the IPC is composed of candidates 
selected by the Prime Minister, albeit with the mandatory approval of a number of 
legal officials including the Lord Chief Justice.  
 
Purposes required for authorization & the list of bodies that can 
make authorizations (Schedule 4)  
Section 61 § 7 of the IPA 2016 permits a large number of bodies to 
grant authorizations, enabling the applicant to access and examine communications 
data. Moreover, the purposes for which these authorizations can be granted are also 
quite numerous (see. Chapter 2 (a) (ii) of this thesis.) Warrants, on the other hand, 
are limited to situations that concern the interests of national security, preventing or 
detecting a serious crime and the interests of the economic well-being of the United 
Kingdom. Even though these categories are quite broad it would, arguably, be a 
                                                 
227 Baroness Jones of Moulsecombe, ‘Data Retention and the Investigatory Powers Bill, 
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difficult feat of reasoning to include some of the purposes included in Section 61 § 
7 within their ambit. The reason why the drafting of the Act sees fit to include such 
a broad and comprehensive list of purposes is worthy of note and consideration, 
given that it could potentially lead to the abuse of such powers, enabling access to 
communications data in situations that, arguably, should not lead to such surveillance 
measures. One could hazard the question of whether the difference in the nature of 
the communications data and communications themselves (the former being 
debatably more intrusive than the latter) has resulted in this difference  
 
Lack of judicial oversight for authorizations but not for warrants 
Whereas data retention notices and warrants require the approval of 
the JC before they come into force, it is not the same for authorizations to access 
communications data. The decision is completely up to the ‘senior officer of a public 
relevant public authority’ to grant the authorization. This omission could be 
explained by the fact that the JCs are involved in the course of issuing data retention 
notices to ISPs with the ISPs, of course, being the sources of the communications 
data. Notwithstanding, it seems peculiar that the safeguard surrounding the granting 
of authorizations is so comparatively weak. Similar to what I said before, perhaps 
the reason for this difference lies in the perception of intrusiveness, with 
communications data (it being a form of secondary data) not being considered as 
sensitive.  
 
Bulk interception warrants, bulk interference warrants, and bulk 
authorizations 
I did not go into detail on bulk warrant and authorizations given the 
similarity of the provisions with their targeted counterparts. However, therein lies 
the criticism. Even though they include the tests of necessity and proportionality, 
given the sheer volume of data involved, some question whether such warrants could 
ever be considered necessary and proportional. Notwithstanding, criticisms 
concerning necessity have also questioned the efficacy of collection such large 
amounts of data229; whether it is indeed necessary to prevent crime and protect 
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national security. Bulk powers can also be viewed as being too intrusive to fulfill the 
test of proportionality, with some speculating that: 
 
…The collection of vast volumes of data enables the identification of 
patterns and predictions of future behavior, a process called predictive analytics, data 
mining or Big Data. An example of this technique is a predictive policing system 
called PredPol, which analyses large volumes of crime reports to identify areas with 
high probabilities for certain types of crime.230 
 
The problem with themed warrants 
Warrants on targeted equipment interference have been viewed as 
problematic due to their inclusion of ‘themed warrants’. Bulk warrants and 
authorizations can be viewed as suffering from the same problem in this regard. Bulk 
warrants essentially enable the potential for the personal data of many individuals 
unrelated to the investigation, to have their communications and secondary data be 
subject to collection, examination, and analysis.  
 
The necessity and proportionality test’s lack of direction 
The terms necessity and proportionality are used frequently 
throughout the Parts on warrants, notices, and authorizations. However, I regard the 
lack of any theoretical indication (by way of the Explanatory Notes) or legal 
procedure as to how the test should be practically applied to be a notable omission 
given the complex nature of the situations that the Secretary of State or - in the case 
of authorizations - a senior legal official may be confronted with. That is not to say 
that the Secretary of State is mentally ill-equipped to deal with complex and critical 
scenarios, but the vagueness and subjectivity of the terms could arguably leave them 
open to abuse. Although it would be an extensive and extremely hard feat of legal 
drafting to accomplish; if such the test was elaborated on with some precision by the 
Act (possibly by way of a non-exhaustive list of potential scenarios), there would be 
a firmer legal basis from which to dispute them. That is not to say that necessity and 
proportionality are vague as part of English legal culture. Indeed, there is a massive 
common-law legal corpus dealing with precisely this issue, concerning every 
conceivable legal discipline. That said, we must realize that the Secretary of State is 
not a legal mind, and probably not in the best position to make such assessments.  
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Notwithstanding, this issue is almost entirely mitigated by the fact 
that any warrant decision made by the Secretary of State must receive approval by 
the JCs who are trained legal professionals and, as mentioned, apply the tests typical 
of an instance of Judicial Review. All that leaves is the authorizations, which as 
discussed, don’t require any such approvals, and it is on this fact that I move onto 
the next matter. 
 
Lack of judicial oversight for authorizations but not for notices 
This is something I find particularly peculiar, given what each of 
these allows in terms of surveillance. As discussed, notices do not allow government 
agencies to access communications data from ISPs; it merely orders them to retain 
connection records for a maximum of 12 months. Authorizations, however, allow 
numerous employees from numerous government agencies to access and 
examination of connections data. Given this very fact alone, the expectation that 
authorizations should require a greater level of legal safeguards than notices is not 
an unreasonable one. Indeed, the only situation in which the JC are required to 
approve an authorization is in contained in Part 3, section 77: “Commissioner 
Approval for authorizations to identify or confirm journalistic sources.” For me, it is 
this omission alone that is the most poses the most obvious threat to conceptions of 
privacy.   
 
Interference & Interception; is specificity important? 
In Chapter 1.3(5) I detailed some ways in which one could effectuate 
acts of, what the IPA 2016 refers to as, interception and equipment interference. 
These vague terms are not unique to the IPA 2016 are, as the ECtHR jurisprudence 
shows, is used by similar types of surveillance legislation (I.e. Germany as G10 Act 
as discussed in the ECHR case, Weber231) in other European countries. The question 
is – does it matter that specifics are not mentioned in Acts concerning internet 
surveillance or should they be considered as materially relevant to considerations of 
necessity and proportionality? This suggestion coincides with another of my 
discourse on how alternate methods of internet surveillance (as well as forms of old 
and new surveillance) could be considered as affecting different degrees of privacy 
infringement, some methods being theoretically more intrusive.  
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 For example, one could argue equipment interference as being 
theoretically more intrusive, given that it requires the forced requisition or physical 
property. Moreover, both interception and interference can harvest a multitude of 
types of data. A communication (as it is referred to in the Act) is not confined to text 
as in an email but also video and audio.  
Indeed, one may feel that video data is a greater infringement to their 
privacy than text, giving credence to the idea that the ‘types of data’ one is likely to 
intercept should factor into the test of necessity and proportionality. Of course, 
whether certain types of surveillance offend sensibilities more than others is simply 
a matter of opinion and can vary greatly from person to person. That is not to say 
that subjective stances don’t work their way into law when they are shared 
sufficiently (consider the European Consensus doctrine, for example). Subjective 
opinions becoming part of the legal reasoning is something that I think is exemplified 
in the case, Malone.232 
This brief commentary on some aspects of the IPA 2016 will form 
part of my consideration of the Act in view of ECHR jurisprudence. I hope to expand 
on these issues more with the aim of drawing some tentative conclusions on whether 
they bare any significance on whether the Act adequately fulfills its human rights 
obligations under Article 8 ECHR. This is what I will move onto next.  
  
2.7 Conclusion to Chapter 2  
 
With this Chapter, I have aimed to provide a clear and precise 
summary of the salient provisions of the Act so as to provide a solid foundation for 
further analysis. 
 I am keen to emphasize the fact that the IPA 2016 is not entirely 
original. Indeed much of its contents (primarily those on interception and equipment 
interference) have existed prior to the passing of the IPA, in the form of RIPA and 
other Acts, for nearly two decades which formed part of a broader surveillance remit 
that also included covert human intelligence sources. As such, much of what I will 
go on to say about the IPA can, in many places be applied to RIPA as well.  
Notwithstanding, the IPA is quite groundbreaking in its inclusion of clauses on data 
retention notices and authorizations. It signifies a key evolutionary stage of UK 
surveillance law, attempting a more comprehensive incorporation of the Internet, 
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law-makers recognizing how it has become such an intimate part of our lives and 
how browsing habits can provide an invaluable window into our souls. For me, these 
provisions are of the greatest concern, especially given the apparent lack of 
safeguards. I am keen to analyze the ECHR jurisprudence to see the judgment 
provide any clues as to the legality of such measures.  
The last part of the chapter was just to underline aspects of the IPA 
2016 which I deem to be germane to considerations of privacy and the right to 
privacy. They also serve as a springboard from which to analyze the ECHR 
jurisprudence; do they consider these issues in a meaningful extent, such as ideas of 
‘intrusiveness’? If not, extrapolating from past dictums, are there any indications as 
to what conclusions they would draw?  
I will continue with a brief explanation of Article 8 ECHR and the 
tests that have emerged hitherto, with which surveillance methods have been 
qualitatively assessed regarding their compliance with Article 8.  
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3 The IPA 2016 vs. Article 8, ECHR 
  
 Before engaging with the question of my thesis, I will attempt to 
briefly summarize the key elements of Article 8 ECHR as well as the methodologies 
applied by the ECtHR when considering whether a particular practice or law is in 
breach. I feel that this will serve as a useful starting point.  
 
3.1 Article 8§1 ECHR  
  
 Article 8§1 states that: 
 
  Everyone had the right to respect for his private life, 
his home, and his correspondence.   
 
 As one can see, there is no explicit mention of surveillance with the 
key terms this Article being: 1) private life 2) family life 3) home and 4) 
correspondence. The first question is; how has the ECtHR interpreted these terms 
and can forms of Internet surveillance be considered as falling within their ambit?  
 
3.1 (a) ECtHR Article 8 Jurisprudence: broadening the concept 
of private life 
As identified by Boehm 233 , the ECtHR has established one 
overarching principle concerning Article 8§1. This is namely that: private life is a 
‘broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition.’234 The principle coincides with 
the ECtHR’s seeming unwillingness to state, in a precise or consistent way, what 
types of content can be considered as falling within Article 8§1.235  Indeed, some 
have seen fit to label the court’s conceptions of private life as ‘ill-defined and an 
amorphous.’ 236  Notwithstanding, one could see the origin of this approach as 
deriving from the ECtHR’s treatment of the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’ that ‘must 
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be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.’237 By refusing to specify what 
private life is, the ECtHR prevents inadvertently stymying itself in producing new 
interpretations in response to technological developing or cultural changes.  
It is fairly clear from the case law that the ECtHR does regard the idea 
of personal data protection and surveillance (as a part and parcel of the idea of 
personal data protection) as falling within the ambit of Article 8§1 while managing 
to keep it  ‘logically…within the boundaries.’238 So, how have the ECtHR achieved 
this? 
Klass and Others239 was one of the earliest cases to be brought before 
the ECtHR under Article 8 and directly addresses, what can be considered as, forms 
of surveillance. It concerns a piece legislation enacted by the German government 
entitled; Restrictions on the Secrecy of Mail, Post and Telecommunications Act, 
which, in certain circumstances, permits the ‘competent authorities…’ to ‘open and 
inspect mail and post, read telegraphic messages, listen to and record telephone 
conversations.’ 240  Given that Article 8§1 expressly concerns ‘…home and 
correspondence…’ the relevance of the aforementioned legislation’s content is fairly 
uncontentious. There was brief discourse as to whether ‘telephone conversations’ 
constituted ‘correspondence’, to which the court answered in the affirmative (in line 
with the opinion of the European Commission). 241 
Thus far, from the perspective of surveillance and data protection, the 
literal scope of Article 8§1 seems fairly restrictive. Niemietz242, however, was a 
landmark case that intentionally broadened the concept of private life. It came at a 
time when previous judgments seemed intent on developing and crystallizing Article 
8§1’s exact content.243 According to Boehm, it was this case that allowed for future 
expansion of Article 8§1 ‘in light of the current data protection context’ and 
surveillance concerns.244 
One way the judgment arguably achieved this was to separate the 
notion of private life from that of the home or the private sphere. The court states 
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that one’s ‘inner circle245’ is, indeed, an important part of the notion of private life 
but does not serve to limit its application. The court continues by saying that Article 
8 should also encompass ‘the right to establish and develop relationships with other 
human beings’. This is used as a justification for private life not excluding activities 
outside the home (including those of a ‘professional or business nature’) given that 
these present the greatest opportunities in which one can ‘establish and develop’ 
relationships.  
Admittedly, the argumentation in Niemietz does strike me as being 
rather unclear and it is difficult to distinguish the main thrust of the argument. That 
said, for me, the judgments main importance is the way in which it chooses to focus 
on this idea of relationships, a concept so vague so as to potentially expand Article 
8 to all things considered ‘part and parcel246’ of life. This is, in my view, essentially 
how Niemietz establishes the path for wider consideration of data protection and 
surveillance issues under Article 8.  
 
3.1(b) ECtHR Article 8 Jurisprudence: The right to data 
protection/The right not to be put under surveillance  
The principles inherent to the Niemietz judgment have subsequently 
been reiterated and expanded in a number of cases.247 This has served to cement the 
persuasive authority of this decidedly vague and all-encompassing interpretation of 
Article 8 and has led to the creation of the subordinate right to data protection, which 
is also exceedingly broad in its scope.  
Indeed, as elucidated by Boehm248, when discussing the scope of the right 
to data protection the court refers to Council of Europe Convention No.108 on data 
protection whose function is to ‘…secure…for every individual …respect for his 
rights and fundamental freedoms, an in particular for his right to privacy with regard 
to automatic processing of personal data relating to him’249 while data is described 
as ‘any information relating to an identified or identifiable individual.’250 The two 
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defining features of the right to data protection thus seems to be 1) there is 
information and 2) the information must be of a personal nature.251 
 Some of the cases brought under Article 8 in relation to personal 
information (contained in the HUDOC’s ‘person data protection’ factsheet252) have 
concerned the improper storage, use, retrieval or destruction of 1) health and medical 
data (Chave nèe Jullien253, L.L254 and L.H.255) 2) DNA and fingerprints (S. and 
Marper256) 3) Police files/caution data (B.B257 and Dimitrov-Kazakov258) and 4) 
other personal data (Peck259). For a case to qualify under Article 8, it is not necessary 
for the data to have been stored, used, retrieved or destroyed in any particular way260. 
As stated, it is only necessary for the application to be about types of 1) information 
and 2) that the information is of a personal nature. Notwithstanding, the large 
majority have factual circumstances that detail acts of police surveillance. In this 
sense, the established right to data protection can similarly be seen as a right not to 
be put under surveillance (something to which HUDOC makes reference through its 
mass surveillance document).261 Naturally, Internet surveillance would be included 
within this. 
 
3.2 Article 8§2 ECHR 
 
 Article 8§2 ECHR states as follows:  
 
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the 
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary 
in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the 
protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.  
                                                 
251 Op.cit. Boehm, pp.12 
252ECHR Press Unit, ‘Personal data protection’, , 
(http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Data_ENG.pdf) 
253 See. Chave nèe Jullien v. France, Application No. 14461/88  
254 See. L.L. v. France, ECHR 2006-XI 
255 See. L.H. v. Latvia, [2014] ECHR 515 
256 See. S. and Marper v. the United Kingdom, [2008] ECHR 1581  
257 See. B.B. v. France, ECHR 1998-VI2595  
258 See. Dimitrov-Kazakov v. Bulgaria, Application No. 11379/03  
259 Op.cit. Peck v. United Kingdom   
260 Op.cit. Boehm, pp.12 
261ECHR Press Unit,  ‘Mass surveillance’, , 
(http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Mass_surveillance_ENG.pdf) 
68 
 
 3.2(a) In accordance with the law 
 This essentially stipulates that any interference with Article 8 must be 
prescribed in domestic law. It is not sufficient for an interference to be merely 
included in the law, however. The law in question must also meet a number of 
standards, so as to ensure that it is of sufficient quality. These standards have been 
established and developed by a number of ECtHR judgments and can be accurately 
described as the following: 1) compliance with the rule of law 2) accessibility and 3) 
foreseeability.  
 Underlining these three criteria is the idea that any interference by the 
public authorities should not be arbitrary262 and that safeguards should be included 
in the law to guard against it. In terms of ECtHR jurisprudence, the concept of 
foreseeability has been their main focus.  
 The Sunday Times Case263 deems the law must be foreseeable on the 
basis that: ‘You cannot enjoy or exercise the right to freedom of expression if the 
enjoyment of such right is made conditional and subject to a law or a rule or principle 
abounding in uncertainties’. The judgment goes on to state that; laws should be 
‘formulated with sufficient precision to enable citizens to regulate his conduct…’ so 
he can ‘reasonably foresee the consequences which a given action could entail.’264  
 In cases of secret surveillance, this does not necessarily mean that the 
subject in question should be informed of the fact that they are being subjected to 
such measures (and thus undermining its value).265 It has simply been taken to mean 
that, where such practices are permitted, there must exist comprehensive and clear 
and rules as to when it can be employed.  
 
 3.2 (b) Necessary in a democratic society 
 As covered by Article 8§2 ECHR, the state can lawfully interfere with 
the ‘right to privacy’ if the interference is considered ‘necessary in a democratic 
society’ in interests of national security, public safety, economic well-being of the 
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. The ECtHR is 
perpetually honing and developing these definitions. 
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The cases Silver266, Kvasnica, and Kennedy267 interpret ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’ as requiring a determination on a) whether the interference in 
question is responding to a pressing and legitimate social need and b) whether the 
interference is ‘proportional’ in its response to the social need268 (otherwise known 
as the test of proportionality). Whether something is proportional depends on the 
“seriousness of the interests at stake and the gravity of the interference.” This is, 
naturally, is entirely dependent on the precise factual circumstances of the case. 
269270271  The state is generally afforded a wide margin of appreciation on these 
matters but this is adjusted to account for questions of proportionality. When a 
response is considered disproportionate, the margin of appreciation is interpreted 
more narrowly.  
 Something that is commonly utilized in the application of the doctrine 
of proportionality is The European Consensus Standard. The standard is not applied 
in a uniform manner given the differing views on what consensus implies. 272 
Notwithstanding, it is generally held to refer to the court’s consideration of how the 
other Member States deal with matters of a similar nature; how do they respond to 
this social need? This is used to determine whether or not the margin of appreciation 
is wider or narrower in a given case. If a state is found to achieve the same ends 
using a less intrusive method, then the margin of appreciation will be made narrower 
unless the circumstances can be sufficiently distinguished.273 
  
 3.2(c) Conclusion to 3.2  
Here I have provided a brief introduction to some concepts that will 
help me determine whether certain laws and practices in the UK are in breach of 
Article 8. These concepts can be essentially refined into two key ideas; 1) 
foreseeability and 2) necessity. As I have discussed, both of these respond to the 
relative intrusiveness of the interference. With foreseeability, the more intrusive the 
measure, the more precise and detailed the domestic law must be. With necessity, 
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the more intrusive the measure, the narrower the margin of appreciation and the less 
likely that it will be considered as proportional to achieve the aim pursued.  
 
3.3 Analysis of the legality of the IPA 2016 under Article 8  
 
In my overview of the IPA 2016 in Chapter 2, I divided the act into 
four parts, these being: 1) interception of communications (targeted and bulk) 2) 
equipment interference (targeted and bulk) 3) Obtaining communications data and 
3) Notices following ‘authorization’ and data retention. This chapter will consider 
these collectively, albeit providing due concern for the differences between them. 
My analysis will begin with whether the element in question is 
foreseeable and then I will move on to the question of necessity. In order to hone my 
research, I will be primarily considering those ECHR cases, which have dealt with 
the legality of domestic legislation and its practical applications under Article 8. 
Indeed, as noted by the Court in the Weber274 application: ‘the mere existence of 
legislation which allowed a system for the secret monitoring of communications 
entails a threat of surveillance for all those whom the legislation must be applied.’ 
There will be a particular emphasis on laws concerning methods of Internet 
surveillance although, given the distinct lack of complete decisions in this area (the 
majority of them pending with the Court merely ‘noting’ the applications), I will 
consider cases that involve other forms of new surveillance (such as the interception 
of telephone calls). Through these, I will attempt to extrapolate the court’s response 
to comparable forms of Internet surveillance, in terms of levels of ‘intrusiveness’ as 
well as their response to the IPA 2016. I will also limit my research to those, which 
involve state surveillance as opposed to the use of surveillance by private 
organizations or actors.  
 
3.3 (a) In accordance with the law; foreseeability   
 Many of the cases concerning surveillance commence with a 
consideration of the measures’ compatibility with Article 8(2)’s ‘in accordance with 
the law requirement’. As discussed, this necessitates an assessment of the 
foreseeability of the law in question. As highlighted in Chapter 3.2, foreseeability 
does not express the requirement that “an individual should be able to foresee when 
the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can adapt his 
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conduct accordingly.”275 This only serves to belie the ‘secret’ and ‘special context’ 
in which it is instigation. Indeed, this interpretation of foreseeability has gone onto 
form somewhat of a legal precedent, being repeated in the surveillance cases: 
Malone, Leander, and Rotaru amongst others. Instead, foreseeability is interpreted 
as referring to whether the measures under dispute are sufficiently clear so as to “give 
an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which 
the public authorities are empowered to resort to any such measures.”276 This is 
viewed as being particularly necessary due to the fact that “the technology available 
for use is continually becoming more sophisticated.”277 
 On a brief side-note, what is particularly interesting is the way that 
the latter statement seems to suggest that the law must evolve alongside technology 
i.e. where technology has developed an added dimension of sophistication, resulting 
in a greater potential for abuse; the legal safeguards dictating its use should be more 
demanding. The technology considered in Zakharov is referred to as interception, 
the same term used by the IPA 2016. Whether the relative sophistication of 
surveillance technology affects the court’s assessment of whether the law strikes the 
right balance is something that I will consider in Chapter 3.4.  
 Notwithstanding, pieces of legislation that fail to achieve adequate 
levels of clarity concerning the parameter within which certain surveillance methods 
can be used, increases the risk of them being used in an arbitrary fashion. The 
concept of ‘arbitrariness’ is one of the fundamental limbs of Article 8(2) ECHR’s 
‘test of necessity’. This is where a lot of cases start with an assessment of 
foreseeability. As you can see, the tests of foreseeability and necessity are very 
closely intertwined in this respect. This is exemplified by Zakharov given the fact 
that there are no clear indicators as to when the judgment’s considerations of 
foreseeability end and their application of the test of necessity begins. This was also 
explicitly mentioned in the Dragojevic, §89 whereby the court opts to consider both 
‘in accordance with the law’ and the ‘necessity’ test due to them being ‘closely 
related.’  
 I will progress onto the court’s dialogues on whether surveillance 
legislation achieves the requisite level of clarity and precision in the scope of 
application of their provisions in the next section.  
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3.3 (b) Necessity and Proportionality  
Klass constitutes one of the earliest surveillance cases brought before 
the ECHR and, as such, goes through all the motions when considering whether 
methods of secret surveillance are in breach of Article 8(2). Indeed, in the early 
stages of the judgment, the court feels it necessary to mention that ‘the development 
of terrorism in recent years…’ and ‘highly sophisticated forms of espionage’ means 
that it is necessary for states to undertake ‘secret surveillance subversive elements’ 
in order to ‘counter such threats.’278 This merely has the effect of not completely 
ruling out the legality of the use of secret surveillance in line with Article 8(2). 
Although the statement is broad, failing to refer to any specific methods of 
surveillance. Notwithstanding, it is from this point that the tests of ‘necessity and 
proportionality’ have been developed.  
 The first issue that courts tend to address in their application of the 
test of ‘necessity and proportionality’ is whether the law or measures in question had 
a ‘legitimate aim’ (See. chapter 3.2 (a)).  
This was an uncontentious issue in Klass279, with the aims of the 
relevant act being drafted clearly and precisely. Indeed, the aims of the ‘Restrictions 
on the Secrecy of Mail, Post and Telecommunications’ Act (otherwise known as 
‘G10’) are stated as being: to protect against ‘imminent dangers’ threatening ‘the 
free democratic and constitutional order’280. The Court considered this as being 
within the ambit of the ‘legitimate aims’ provided for by Article 8 (2), namely: ‘to 
safeguard national security and/or to prevent disorder or crime.’281  
In all the cases following Klass (such as Weber, Kennedy, and 
Szabo), the issue of ‘legitimate aim’ has received the minimum degree of attention. 
This is namely due to the fact that the domestic law permitting activities such as 
secret surveillance, at the very least, allude to the fact that it is in the name of 
protecting ‘the interests of national security, public safety, the economic well-being 
of a country…’282 within its provisions. Moreover, the fact of the legislation in 
question pursuing a ‘legitimate aim’ is not often subject to contestation by the 
applicants. If we direct our attention to the provisions of the IPA 2016, the fact that 
the Act is pursuing one of Article 8(2)’s legitimate aims is not only stated time and 
time again by a whole host of related documents, it is also a key component upon 
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which an equipment interference or interception warrant or authorization can be 
issued (see. Part 2 Chapter 1, §18, §19 and §20 IPA 2016).  
 After ‘legitimate aim’ is considered (often in brief), the court then 
moves on to the questions of ‘necessity and proportionality’. Klass provides an early 
outline of the court’s methodology in respect to the application of ‘necessity and 
proportionality’ test. It that; ‘whatever system of surveillance adopted’ the court 
must be satisfied that there exists ‘adequate and effective guarantees against abuse.’ 
It clarifies that this test is ‘relative in character’, depending on the ‘circumstances of 
the case’ such as the nature, scope, and duration of possible measures, the authorities 
competent to permit, carry out and supervise such measures, and the kind of remedy 
provided by the national law.’283 It was noted in Weber that the ‘national authorities 
enjoy a fairly wide margin of appreciation in choosing the mean for achieving the 
legitimate aim.’284 
  
 Klass & Weber  
 The applicant’s main complaint in Klass, stemmed from the fact that 
the G10 did not provide for the notification of individuals who had been subject to 
secret surveillance or to the extent that their ‘rights were interfered with’ 285 , 
prohibiting them from seeking legal in the domestic courts. The applicant’s believed 
that this was of paramount importance to ensure that the government did not use their 
powers of surveillance in a manner that was disproportionately excessive. Of course, 
the IPA 2016 resembles the G10 in this sense, that such provisions concerning 
interception of communications and interference of equipment, does not provide any 
post-facto notification system for those who have been subjected to such measures. 
In Klass, the court found that, not providing such notifications for recently suspended 
surveillance measures (or providing such notifications only in very limited 
circumstances286) was necessary in order to achieve the Act’s legitimate aim given 
that providing such notifications could ‘jeopardize the longer-term purpose that 
originally prompted the surveillance’287 and possibly ‘reveal the working methods 
of the investigation’ and lead to the identification ‘of their agents’. 288  For the 
provisions of the Act to negatively effect the efficacy of the interference it permits 
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would go to essentially contradict the principle of necessity. It was on these grounds 
that the court ruled against the applicants. From this, one can hasten to make the 
conclusion that the ECtHR would treat the IPA 2016 in a similar regard.  
In Klass, the court emphasized that the legal safeguards and 
oversights provided for in the Act made it so that the relevant provisions would 
‘reduce the effect of the surveillance measures to an absolute minimum’289, thus 
rendering the Act proportional.  These conditions are found at § 51 - 54 of the 
judgment and I will go on to consider them in further detail in due course.  
Weber also concerned the G10 (albeit the amended version), 
specifically section 3 ((1) – (5)) that legislated for ‘strategic monitoring of telephone 
communications’, which the applicant believed provided for monitoring powers that 
were ‘far too wide’290 and did not ‘correspond to a pressing need on the part of 
society for such surveillance.’291 Like in Klass, the German government responded 
by insisting that such provisions were ‘necessary to combat international 
terrorism’292 with Europe facing an increasing threat from ‘Al-Qaida following the 
terrorist attack of 11 September 2001.’ 293 The government also mentioned that it 
was important to prevent international arms trafficking and it was impossible to 
‘counter these threats’ without access to the ‘strategic monitoring of 
telecommunications.’294  
The court also found in the government’s favor, deeming that they 
had struck a reasonable, proportional balance through their ‘limitation of the offenses 
through which data transmission was permitted’ 295  and by ‘the provision of 
supervisory mechanisms against abuse.’296 Regarding the G10’s inclusion of various 
supervisory mechanisms, the court highlighted that they essentially remained the 
same as those contained in the previous version considered in Klass (See. Above) 
and saw no reason to alter their decision in this regard. Indeed, the G10 makes it so 
that surveillance can only be ordered by a written application by the head of the 
security services with a ‘Federal Minister empowered for the purpose’297 giving the 
final say. There are also conditions concerning the implementation of surveillance 
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measures, the time in which the surveillance measure can ‘remain in force’, what 
happens to data that has been obtained during the course of the surveillance amongst 
others.  
Regarding the Act’s ‘limitation of offenses through which data 
transmission was permitted’, the Court noted that the amendments made had 
‘considerably extended the range of subjects in respect of which’ strategic 
monitoring ‘could be carried out under section 3(1).298 This was the source of the 
applicant’s central point of contention, he deeming that some of the subjects included 
on the list were not ‘such a pressing need on the part of society’299 that it justified 
the use of such intrusive measures. Moreover, increasing technological capabilities 
meant that it now possible to ‘identify the telephone connections involved in 
intercepted communications.’300 In the applicant’s view, these factors combined to 
make the amended G10 disproportional.  
Whereas the original G10 (as considered in Klass) only permitted 
such monitoring in cases wherein ‘order to detect and avert an armed attack on 
Germany’, the amended version contains a list which also permits monitoring in 
cases that fall within an exhaustive list of broadly defined ‘serious offences’301 found 
in section 3(1) (one of these being ‘counterfeiting money abroad’). In consideration 
of this, the ECtHR still maintained the amended legislation as being proportional. 
The court referred back to the restrictive safeguards, oversights, and limitations on 
powers included in the original G10 as being still adequate to satisfy the test of 
proportionality, even in view of the amended section 3(1). Moreover, it highlighted 
the fact that the additional ‘serious offenses’ listed still had notions of ‘national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country’ at their core302, but 
this was only a minor additional point.   
The provisions of the IPA 2016 that bear the closest resemblance to 
those disputed in this are those concerning the interception of communications. 
Given their close resemblance, it is reasonable to suggest that the court would have 
also found this portion of the IPA 2016 to be in keeping with Article 8 in this regard.  
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Kennedy  
Kennedy v. UK concerns the IPA 2016’s legal forebear, RIPA and 
looks at provisions concerning ‘interception of communications.’ The court's 
consideration of necessity begins with an examination of RIPA’s provisions that 
serve limit the government’s use of interception techniques. Early in the judgment, 
the court highlights the link between the test of foreseeability and that of necessity. 
Clearly defining the acts or categories of people that are liable to have their 
communications intercepted is intrinsic to preventing the disproportionate use of 
such techniques, hence its relevance. Following from their considerations of RIPAs 
foreseeability, the courts were satisfied, believing the categories to be sufficiently 
clear so as to guard against the ‘indiscriminate capturing of vast amounts of 
communications’303 which, of course, would be considered as in breach of the test of 
necessity.  
As detailed in Chapter 2 of this thesis, the RIPA and the IPA 2016 
employs a warrant system. The court goes on to consider what should be contained 
in a warrant, specifying that it must ‘clearly specify either by name or by description, 
one person as the interception subject or a single set of premises as the premises in 
respect the warrant is ordered.’ 304  A schedule to the warrant must also contain 
‘names, addresses, telephone number and other relevant information…’305 Again, 
this is imperative for the prevention of using such powers in an indiscriminate way.  
‘Interception warrants’ under the IPA 2016 and RIPA last for 6 
months unless canceled earlier.306 However, the Acts contain provisions on warrant 
renewal, which makes no stipulations as to the total number of renewals permitted; 
essentially making the total time a warrant can be in effect indefinite. The court is 
quick to establish that RIPA’s decision to omit such provisions is not 
disproportionate to the Act’s aims, given the fact that the complexity of cases may 
mean that investigation will take an inordinate length of time to complete.307 This is, 
of course; only as long as there are adequate safeguards exist so as to limit the 
potential for abuse. Given that a renewal is subject to the same safeguards as creation 
and existing warrants must also be canceled if they fall short of these safeguards308 
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(requiring them to be under a constant state of review), the court was satisfied in this 
regard.  
The ECtHR goes on to examine RIPA’s procedures for the 
examination, use, storage, processing, communication and destruction of intercepted 
material, detailing to relevant provisions.309 In detailing their salient elements, the 
Court was satisfied that they ‘provided adequate safeguards for the protection of data 
obtained.’310  
RIPA’s supervisory provisions are also considered with the court 
noting that that, given the fact that abuse is ‘potentially so easy in individual cases 
and could have such harmful consequences for democratic society as a whole’ it is 
‘desirable to entrust supervisory role to a judge.’ That said, the judgment 
communicates satisfaction that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal (IPT), established 
by the act, is suitably impartial, informed and independent to carry out this function. 
Satisfaction is also expressed towards the IPT’s mandated powers, enabling them to 
authorize, execute and cancel warrants as well as their role as arbitrators of 
complaints levied by members of the public.311 Moreover, the publication of the 
IPT’s ‘legal rulings’, add to RIPA’s relative transparency. All in all, the ECtHR, in 
this case, found that there was no breach of Article 8.  
In line with the ECtHR’s approval of RIPA, what would their opinion 
be of its legal descendant, the IPA 2016? Well, as discussed, the IPA 2016 is more 
of a consolidation of past surveillance laws, drawing heavily from RIPA. While IPA 
2016 does make numerous changes and additions to UK surveillance law making the 
scope of its application potentially broader in terms of interception of 
communications, it doesn’t deviate from RIPA to any great extent. In this sense, I 
believe that the ECtHR would find in favor of the provisions concerning the 
categories of person or situation in which a targeted inception warrant can be issued 
under the Act, possibly regarding them as being sufficiently precise (that is not to 
say that the ECtHR would necessarily find the same in reference to anything other 
than targeted interception).  
Regarding the Court’s positive stance of RIPA’s creation of the IPT 
as a means of providing judicial oversight for interception warrants, I believe they 
would also find in favor of the IPA 2016 establishment of the JC and IPC which are, 
more or less, identical in their remit and composition.  
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Szabo and Vissy  
This case concerns ‘telephone tapping’ as contained in Hungary’s 
Police Act and National Security Act.312 Following previously established ECtHR 
jurisprudence, the court commences their analysis of Szabo by reiterating what it 
considers to be the minimum safeguards of law permitting the use of ‘telephone 
tapping’. These were stated to include: 
 
…The definition of the categories of people liable to have their 
telephones tapped; a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the procedure to be 
followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the precautions to be 
taken when communicating data to other parties; and the circumstances in which 
recordings may or must be erased or destroyed.313 
 
In iterating these, the court emphasized that ‘to have clear, detailed 
rules on interception of telephone conversations’ is essential ‘especially as the 
technology available for use is continually becoming more sophisticated.’ 314  Of 
course, whether the increasing sophistication of technology materially affects the 
court’s considerations of legislation, seeking to use such technological development 
for surveillance purposes remains to be seen. I hope to approach the subject in the 
next chapter.  
The applicant’s main contention was that the provisions in question 
were not ‘sufficiently detailed or precise to meet the foreseeability requirement.’315 
Whereas foreseeability is typically considered one of the criterions through which 
the court assesses whether provisions are of sufficient quality to be ‘in accordance 
with the law’, in this instance it is integrated with the court's application of the test 
of necessity. Indeed, as expounded in previous cases, the provisions must be 
‘sufficiently precise’316 to guard against abuse and arbitrariness and with due regard 
to its legitimate aim.  
As with previous cases, the judgment concedes to the fact that 
provisions providing for surveillance powers need not be overly rigid due to the 
complicated, fast-developing nature of the situations they seek to legislate for.317  
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The court notes that surveillance legislation must clearly define the 
types of persons as well as the situations that may give to the interception of 
communications.318 It is along these lines that the court takes issue with Section 7/E 
(3) of the Act in question. This is namely to do with the way the provision seems to 
equate the notion of “persons concerned identified…as a range of persons’319 and its 
potential to allow for the ‘unlimited surveillance of a large number of people.’320 The 
provision did not impose the requirement that the authorities should first 
‘demonstrate the actual or presumed relation between the persons concerned…and 
the prevention of any terrorist threat.’321 Only then, can the test of necessity be 
adequately applied.  
In reference to my consideration of the ‘thematic’ nature of the IPA 
2016’s equipment interference warrants, one can make a connection with the court’s 
findings in relation to Section 7/E (3). As detailed, there is no requirement in the IPA 
2016 to show that a person has a material connection with the threat prompting the 
investigation; it must only be showed that there is a link between that person and the 
individual who may be the key focus of the investigation. This link could have been 
in the past as well as the present (the same goes for organization or locations that 
may be subject to an equipment interference warrant). From this, we can assume that 
the court would not be in favor of this particular provision and, may deem it to be 
contrary to Article 8 (2).  
That said, Section 7/E considers in Szabo and Section 101, IPA 2016 
deal with the acquisition of communications data and secondary data via different 
means: through interception in the former and equipment interference in the latter. 
One might speculate that ‘thematic warrants’ are somehow more practical and 
appropriate for equipment interference, unlike interception. This could be related to 
the fact that particular pieces of equipment can have their locations frequently 
changed, be used by many different people and organizations, necessitating a broader 
and more undefined approach to warrant criteria. Such considerations may change 
the Court’s mind in this regard. It is, however, impossible to really say one way or 
the other with reference to the established jurisprudence.  
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Kruslin 
This telephone-tapping case resembles Szabo - the court taking issue 
with how the piece of French surveillance law in question ‘does not indicate with 
reasonable clarity the scope and manner of the exercise of the relevant discretion 
confers on the public authorities.’322 Indeed, in this case, the law was found in breach 
of Article 8. Admittedly, this is a comparatively more clear-cut case given the fact 
that no specifications were made concerning ‘the categories of people liable to have 
their phones tapped by judicial order and the nature of the offenses that might give 
rise to such an order…’323, thus it was not necessary to go into the technicalities.  
 
3.4 Commentary on Chapter 3.3; the issue of comparative 
intrusiveness 
  
The issue of comparative intrusiveness is communicated numerous 
times by ECHR case-law concerning internet surveillance. Indeed, in Szabo, the 
court emphasizes that, in response to the development of ‘cutting-edge technologies’ 
that are able to massively monitor communications and automate the systemic 
collection of data, legal safeguards securing respect for citizen’s Convention rights 
must be developed ‘simultaneously’.324 It was on this basis Szabo was distinguished 
from Kennedy. Whereas the ‘impugned legislation’ in the Kennedy case did not 
“allow for the ‘indiscriminate capturing of vast amounts of communications,’” in 
Szabo, this was the perceived effect of the ‘broad-based provisions’ of the legislation 
under consideration (The National Security Act).325 This was viewed as the key 
reason by which Kennedy was deemed not to be in breach of Article 8. 
Notwithstanding, the court also made reference to the types of information that are 
vulnerable to collection in their considerations, stating them as representing the 
‘most intimate aspects of citizens’ lives.’326 
 
 
 
                                                 
322 See. Kruslin v. France, Application no. 11801/85, §36  
323 Ibid. §35  
324 Op.cit Szabo,§68  
325 Ibid. §69  
326 Ibid. §70  
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4 Conclusions and final remarks 
 
Now I will attempt to draw some tentative conclusion and final 
remarks on all that I have considered throughout this thesis.  
 In terms of the compatibility of the IPA 2016 with Article 8 ECHR, I 
believe that certain parts are in line with the case-law I considered, and other parts 
are not. Notwithstanding, the parts of the IPA 2016 that I find the most concerning 
(the provisions on retention notices and authorizations) have not yet seen any 
specific consideration by the ECtHR with case law being confined to telephone 
tapping, bulk and targeted interception and one instance of metering (Malone). 
Perhaps it will be the subject of a future case!   
 The large majority of the Act, I would consider being in compliance 
with ECtHR jurisprudence given that RIPA was considered in Kennedy v. UK as 
operating within the law - the two Acts sharing the bulk their interception provisions. 
There is some doubt about whether the provisions on equipment interference would 
be permissible given the ‘thematic’ nature of the scope of their application. 
Moreover, I think that authorizations would struggle to comply given their seemingly 
complete lack of the judicial oversight which has been provided for in all other 
sections.   
As you may recall, a large portion of the thesis was committed to 
discussing how alternative methods of surveillance can be considered more or less 
intrusive based on the means employed as well as the results achieved in terms of 
personal data collection. I was also keen to express how the ever-increasing 
technological sophistication of the modern era and the genesis of the internet meant 
that internet surveillance can, in theory, be considered as far beyond any other means 
of surveillance in terms of intrusiveness from both a means and an ends standpoint. 
One of the things I was searching for in my consideration of ECHR case-law was an 
indication that the court was paying due to regard to the nuanced privacy 
implications of alternate surveillance technologies (within the disputed domestic 
law). I was hoping that such considerations would bear a material effect on the 
court’s judgment concerning a law’s compliance with Article 8. 
I was not completely disappointed in this regard. Szabo was one 
judgment whereby the court made explicit reference to how the legal tests deriving 
from Article 8 should be applied in such a way as to give due regard to the relative 
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sophistication and reach of a surveillance measure or technology. The ECtHR went 
on to clarify that, where measures are particularly threatening to privacy, the scope 
of their application should be drafted with greater clarity and precision. As one 
progresses through the judgment, one realizes that this statement is lacking in any 
real meaning. In determining whether the scope of application is sufficiently precise, 
no reference is made to the technicalities of the surveillance measure in the 
judgment. In the end, the court finds itself getting mixed up in something of a 
tautology i.e. the scope of application is too imprecise because the scope of 
application is too imprecise! At no point are we provided with an insight on how 
risks to privacy should have a bearing on precision. Of course, this is not to say that 
this is due to laziness on the part of the court. It is hard to really make these kind of 
assessments when there aren’t a long line of similar cases through which one can 
attempt to delineate whether the court has a real doctrinal approach to this matter. I 
was hoping to also see if such consideration would also have ramifications on the 
application of the test of ‘necessity and proportionality’ but there is very little by 
way of clear dictums to this effect in ECHR jurisprudence.  
I conclude that – at this point in time – the ECtHR is ill-equipped to 
adequately consider the vast and expansive ramifications that methods of internet 
surveillance power on concepts of privacy. The jurisprudence that has been produced 
is of limited value given the courts limited exploration into the idea of ‘intrusiveness’ 
- that I have consistently attempted to draw upon through the entirety of this thesis - 
as well as a fairly basic comprehension of developing technologies (Review Chapter 
1.4 (e) of the thesis). I believe that the Internet truly does provide a ‘window into our 
souls’ on a scale that has never been seen before, providing the tools to track and 
record every movement, every thought, and even every fleeting thought. It also 
provides the tools to send and replicate such data ad infinitum. For the law to truly 
to adapt and change in line with such technology, what is needed it a robust and deep 
consideration of all the issues. I feel the ECtHR, so far, fails in this regard and as a 
result, the law’s evolution is being hindered. Indeed, the same standards concerning 
the doctrine of proportionality – are applied to a wide range of technologies in a way 
that does not seek to differentiate between them in any material way. Cana telephone 
tapping really be considered as comparable to acts of interception of internet 
communications? I believe not.  
 
 
 
83 
 
Bibliography 
 
Books 
 
Boehm, F. (2012), Information Sharing and Data Protection in the Area of Freedom, 
Security and Justice, Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 
 
Castells, M. (1999), The Information Age, Volumes 1-2: economy, Society and 
Culture, Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell  
 
C.E. Howard Vincent (1900), The Police Code and the General Manual of the 
Criminal Law for the British Empire, Kent & Co  
 
Cyrille Fijnaut (1979), Opdat de macht een toevlucht zij? Een historische studie van 
het politie-apparaat al seen politieke instelling, Kluwer Law International 
 
Cyrille Fijnaut & Gary T. Marx (1995), Police Surveillance in Comparative 
Perspective, Kluwer Law International 
 
David Wright (2014), Surveillance in Europe, Routledge 
 
D.G. Browne (1956),The Rise of Scotland Yard; A History of the Metropolitan 
Police, George G. Harap 
 
Dornberger, Walter (1954), V-2, Ballantine 
 
Fuchs, C. (2012), Internet and Surveillance; The Challenges of Web 2.0 and Social 
Media, Routledge  
 
Fuchs, C. & Boersma, K. (2012), Internet and Surveillance, The Challenges of Web 
2.0 and Social Media, Routledge Studies in Science, Technology and Society  
 
Gray (2013), Leon, How does GPS Work, The Rosen Publishing Group 
 
Inder Sidhu (2015), The Digital Revolution: How Connected Digital Innovations 
Are Transforming You Industry, Company and Career, FT Press  
 
Janice Richardson (2017), Law and the Philosophy of Privacy, Routledge  
 
J.J. Tobias (1979), Crime and Police in England (1700 – 1900), Gill and MacMillan 
 
Karen M. Hess (2013), Police Operations: Theory and Practice, Cengage Learning 
 
Kevin D. Mitnick (2011), The Art of Deception: Controlling the Human Element of 
Security, John Wiley & Sons  
 
Kruegle, Herman (2011), CCTV Surveillance: video Practices and Technology, 
Butterworth-Heinemann 
 
L. Radzinowicz (1948 – 1956), A History of English Criminal Law and its 
Administration from 1750, London 
 
84 
 
Marx, Gary T. (2002), What’s new about the “new surveillance”? Classifying for 
change and continuity, Surveillance and Society, 
 
Paul Knepper (2009), Urban Crime Prevention, Surveillance, and Restorative 
Justice: Effects of Social Technologies, CRC Press 
 
Peter Aksoy & Laura DeNardis (2007), Informational technology in Theory, 
Cengage Learning 
 
Peter Wright (1987), Spycatcher: The Candid Autobiography of a Senior 
Intelligence Officer, Stoddart 
 
P. Manuel (1790), La police de Paris dévoilée, J.B. Garnery  
 
Richard W. Kroon (2014), A/V A to Z: An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Media, 
Entertainment and Other Audio-visual Terms, McFarland 
 
Senyonovna, Eugenia (1967), Journey into the Whirlwind, New York: Harcourt, 
Brace & World, Inc.  
 
S.H. Palmer (1988), Police and Protest in England and Ireland 1780 – 1850, CUP 
 
Soustelle, Jacques (2002), The Daily Life of the Aztecas, Phoenix Press 
 
Starke-Meyerring, Doreen and Laura Gurak (2007), Internet Encyclopedia of 
privacy, Greenwood Publishing Group 
 
Zizi A. Papcharissi (2016), A Private Sphere: Democracy in a Digital Age, John 
Wiley & Sons 
 
 
Cases (ECHR) 
 
B.B. v. France, ECHR 1998-VI2595  
 
Chave nèe Jullien v. France, 
Application No. 14461/88  
 
Davis & Ors v. SSHD [2016] EWHC 
2092 
 
Dimitrov-Kazakov v. Bulgaria, 
Application No. 11379/03  
 
Kennedy v. the United Kingdom, 
[2010] ECHR 682 
 
Klass and Others v. Germany, [1978] 
2 EHRR 214 
 
Kruslin v. France, Application no. 
11801/85 
 
Kvasnica v. Slovakia, [2009] ECHR 
872 
 
L.H. v. Latvia, [2014] ECHR 515 
 
L.L. v. France, ECHR 2006-XI 
 
Loizidou v. Turkey, [1995] 20 EHRR 
99  
 
Malone v. the United Kingdom, 
[1984] 7 EHRR 14  
 
Niemietz v. Germany, [1992] 16 
EHRR 97 
 
Peck v. United Kingdom, [2003] 36 
EHRR 41 
 
P.G. and J.H. v. United Kingdom, 
[2008] 46 EHRR 51 
 
2 
 
Pretty v. United Kingdom, [2002] 35 
EHRR 1 
 
Rasmussen v. Denmark, [1984] 
ECHR 17  
 
Roman Zakharov v. Russia, [2015] 
ECHR 1065 
 
S. and Marper v. the United 
Kingdom, [2008] ECHR 1581  
 
Silver v. the United Kingdom, 
[19890] 3 EHRR 475  
 
(The) Sunday Times v. the United 
Kingdom, [1992] 14 EHRR 229  
 
Szabo and Vissy v. Hungary, [2016] 
ECHR 579 
 
Tyrer v. The United Kingdom, 
[1978] 2 EHRR 1  
 
Weber and Saravia v. Germany, 
[2008] 46 EHRR SE5   
 
Z. v. Finland, [1997] 25 EHRR 371 
 
 
Cases (UK) 
 
Peter Semayne v. Richard Gresham 
(1604), 77 ER 194 
Davis & Ors v. SSHD [2016] EWHC 
2092 
 
Leah v. Money (1975) 97 Eng. Rep. 
1075  
 
John Entick, (Clerk) v. Nathan 
Carrington and Three Others (1765), 
EWHC KB J98  
 
Legislation 
 
 Domestic 
 
Computer Misuse Act 1990  
 
Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014  
 
Data Protection Act 1998 
 
Investigatory Powers Act 2016 
 
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 
 
 International  
 
European Convention on Human Rights 
 
Council Directive 2006/24/EC on the retention of data generated or processed in 
connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications 
services or of public communications networks and amending [2006] L105/54 
 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing 
of Personal Data [1985] ETS No.108  
 
Journal Articles 
 
2 
 
Hilbert, Martin & López, Priscila, ‘The World's Technological Capacity to Store, 
Communicate and Compute Information’, Science (2011). 332 (6025): 60–65.  
 
L.R Helfer, ‘Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human 
Rights’, 26 Cornell International law Journal (1993) 
 
Marx, Gary T., ‘What’s new about the “new surveillance”? Classifying for change 
and continuity’ (2002), Surveillance and Society, Volume 1 (1) 
 
Moreham NA, ‘The right to respect for private life in the European convention on 
human rights: a re-examination’, European Human Rights Law Review (1): 44-42 
 
Websites 
 
Andy O’Donnell, ‘What are Packet Sniffers and How Do They Work? 2018, 
Lifewire, (https://www.lifewire.com/what-is-a-packet-sniffer-2487312 
 
BBC News, ‘UK, Most Watched Nation by CCTV’, 21 July 2009, 
(http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/8160757.stm) 
 
Big Brother Watch, Investigatory Powers Act Factsheet; Bulk Personal Datasets, 
2016, (https://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Bulk-
Personal-Datasets.pdf)  
 
Big Brother Watch, ‘The Price of Privacy: How local authorities spent £515m on 
CCTV in four years’, 2002, 
(https://www.bigbrotherwatch.org.uk/files/priceofprivacy/Price_of_privacy_2012.p
df) 
 
Bill Stewart, ‘IPTO – Information Processing Techniques Office, The Living 
Internet’, 2000 (http://www.livinginternet.com/i/ii_ipto.htm) 
 
Camilla Graham Wood, Thematic warrants: ‘Destroying democracy under the 
cloak of defending it.’ (2016), Solicitors Journal 
(https://www.solicitorsjournal.com/comment/thematic-warrants-destroying-
democracy-under-cloak-defending-it) 
 
‘Commons passes emergency data laws despite criticism’, BBC News, 15 July 
2014 (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-28305309) 
 
David Anderson, ‘A Question of Trust; Report of the Investigatory Powers 
Review’, Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, 2015, 
(https://terrorismlegislationreviewer.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/IPR-Report-Web-Accessible1.pdf)   
 
Dominic Casciani, ‘Spy Pictures of Suffragettes Revealed’, BBC News Online, 3 
October 2003 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/3153024.stm) 
 
Federal Trade Commission, ‘Monitoring Software on Your PC: Spyware, Adware, 
and Other Software, Staff Report: Federal Trade Commission’, 2005, 
(https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/spyware-workshop-
monitoring-software-your-personal-computer-spyware-adware-and-other-software-
report/050307spywarerpt.pdf) 
 
3 
 
Griffin, A., ‘Investigatory Powers Act Goes into Force, Putting UK Citizens under 
Intense New Spying Regime’, The Independent Newspaper, 31 Dec 2016 
(http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/investigatory-
powers-act-bill-snoopers-charter-spying-law-powers-theresa-may-a7503616.html)  
 
Griffin, A. ‘The Government Quietly Launched ‘Assault on Freedom’ While 
Distracting People, Say Campaigners Behind Legal Challenge’, The Independent, 9 
Jan 2017 (http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-
tech/news/investigatory-powers-act-liberty-legal-challenge-high-court-opposition-
a7518136.html)  
 
Griffin A., ‘U.K. spying laws: government introduced law requiring WhatsApp and 
iMessage to break their own security’, The Independent, 12 March 2016 
(http://www.independent.co.uk/life-style/gadgets-and-tech/news/uk-spying-laws-
uk-government-introduces-law-requiring-whatsapp-and-imessage-to-be-broken-
a6905106.html) 
 
Home Office, ‘DRAFT Code of Practice; Bulk Acquisition’, Autumn 2016, 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/557
863/IP_Bill_-_Draft_Bulk_acquisition_code_of_practice.pdf) 
 
Home Office, ‘DRAFT Code; Communications Data’, Autumn 2016, 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/557
862/IP_Bill_-_Draft_CD_code_of_practice.pdf) 
 
Home Office, ‘DRAFT Code of Practice; Equipment Interference’, December 
2017, 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/668
940/Draft_code_-_Equipment_Interference.pdf) 
 
Home Office, ‘DRAFT Code of Practice; Intelligence Services’ Retention and Use 
of Bulk Personal Datasets’, December 2017, 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/668
933/Draft_BPD-
_Intelligence_Services__Retention_and_Use_of_Bulk_Personal_Datasets.pdf) 
 
Home Office, ‘DRAFT Code of Practice; Interception of Communications’, 
December 2017, 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/668
941/Draft_code_-_Interception_of_Communications.pdf)  
 
Home Office, ‘DRAFT Code of Practice; National Security Notices’, December 
2017, 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/668
939/Draft_code_-_National_Security_Notices.pdf) 
 
Home Office, ‘Factsheet #1 – Communications Data; Data Retention and 
Investigatory Powers Bill’ (2014), 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/330
510/Factsheet_Data_Retention.pdf)  
 
Home Office, Factsheet: Data Definitions, 2016, 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/investigatory-powers-bill-fact-
sheets) 
4 
 
 
Home Office, ‘Retention of Communications Data Codes of Practice’, 9 December 
2014, 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/383
401/Draft_Data_Retention_Code_of_Practice_-_for_publication_2014_12_09.pdf) 
 
HM Revenue and Customs, ‘Money laundering supervision: an introduction’, 23 
October 2014 (https://www.gov.uk/guidance/money-laundering-regulations-
introduction)  
 
‘Investigatory Powers Bill: Context’, 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/530
551/Context_Factsheet.pdf) 
 
‘Investigatory Powers Bill; Factsheet; Targeted Interception’, 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/473
739/Factsheet-Targeted_Interception.pdf) 
 
‘Investigatory Powers Bill; Factsheet – Targeted Communications data’, 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/473
747/Factsheet-Communications_Data_General.pdf) 
 
James Ball, ‘Leak memos reveal GCHQ efforts to keep mass surveillance secret’, 
The Guardian, 25 Oct 2013, (https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2013/oct/25/leaked-memos-gchq-mass-surveillance-secret-snowden) 
 
Jean Camp, ‘The Internet as a Public Space: Concepts, Issues, and Implications in 
Public Policy’, 2000, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 
(https://sites.hks.harvard.edu/mrcbg/research/j.camp_acm.computer_internet.as.pu
blic.space.pdf) 
  
Lee Raine, ‘Census: Computer ownership, internet connection varies widely across 
U.S’, Pew Research Centre, 2014 (http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2014/09/19/census-computer-ownership-internet-connection-varies-widely-
across-u-s/)  
 
Liberty, Liberty’s briefing on Part 6 of the Investigatory Powers Bill for 
Committee Stage in the House of Commons, April 2016 (https://www.liberty-
human-
rights.org.uk/sites/default/files/Liberty%27s%20Briefing%20on%20Part%206%20
of%20the%20Investigatory%20Powers%20Bill%20for%20Committee%20Stage%
20in%20the%20House%20of%20Commons.pdf)  
 
MacAskill, Ewen, ‘Extreme surveillance’ becomes UK law with barely a 
whimper’, The Guardian, 19 Nov 2016 
(https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/19/extreme-surveillance-becomes-
uk-law-with-barely-a-whimper)  
 
MI5, Bulk Data, (https://www.mi5.gov.uk/bulk-data)  
 
Press Release No 54/14, ‘The Court of Justice declares the Data Retention 
Directive to be invalid’, Court of Justice of the European Union, 8 April 2014 
(https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2014-
04/cp140054en.pdf)  
5 
 
 
Press Unit ECHR, ‘Mass surveillance’, 
(http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Mass_surveillance_ENG.pdf) 
 
Press Unit ECHR, ‘Personal data protection’, 
(http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/FS_Data_ENG.pdf) 
 
‘Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000; Explanatory Notes’, 
(http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/23/notes)  
 
Sir Ronnie Flanagan, ‘A Report on the Investigations by Cambridgeshire 
Constabulary into the Murders of Jessica Chapman and Holy Wells at Soham on 4 
August 2002; Summary of Conclusions and Recommendations’ (2002), 
(https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/media/investigation-by-
cambridgeshire-constabulary-20040530.pdf) 
 
Unknown, ‘Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000’, The Guardian, Monday 
19 January 2009, 
(https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2009/jan/14/regulation
-investigatory-powers-act) 
 
Weaver, M., ‘MI5 resisting independent oversight of bulk data collection’, The 
Guardian, 26 July 2016 (https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/26/mi5-
resisted-independent-oversight-of-communications-data-collection) 
 
Parliamentary Debates  
 
Baroness Jones of Moulsecombe, ‘Data Retention and the Investigatory Powers 
Bill’, House of Commons Debate, 15.07.2014 
 
House of Lords & House of Commons Joint Committee on the Draft 
Communications Data Bill, ‘Draft Communications Data Bill’ (2012 – 13), 
 
Cooper, Yvette, ‘Data Retention and the Investigatory Powers Bill’, House of 
Commons Debate, 15.07.2014 
 
May, Theresa, ‘Data Retention and the Investigatory Powers Bill’, House of 
Commons Debate, 15.07.2014 
 
The Lord Bishop of St. Albans, ‘Queen Speech Debate in the Lords Chamber’, 
24.05.2016 
 
Baroness Jones of Moulsecombe, ‘Data Retention and the Investigatory Powers 
Bill, House of Commons Debate’, 15.07.2014  
 
 
 
 
 
  
